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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT" IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

S

By G. W. C. Ross*
1 of article IV of the United States constitution reads
as follows:

ECTION

"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof."
The historic antecedents of this provision are not so readily
traceable as are those of the more famous "due process" clauses.
The last sentence of article IV of the articles of confederation is
almost identical with the first sentence of the constitutional section.1 Prior to the articles of confederation the provision is not
found in American constitutional documents ;2 nor do the framers
of the constitution appear to have adopted the section from any
of the European federal constitutions known to them.3 The
earliest use of the precise locution "faith and credit" that has
been found occurs in an English translation made by Richard
Eden, the Sixteenth Century British publisher, of the bull of Pope
Alexander VI that assumed to delimit the New World between
Spain and Portugal. 4 But while the Latin text of this bull uses
the word "faith" ("fides"), it says nothing of which the further
words "and credit" are a literal translation. Unless Eden coined
his exact phrase, he must have used it because he was accustomed
*Of the Minnesota Bar: Professor of Public Law and History, College
of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
'Not quite identical, however. The sentence in the articles of confederation reads:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other state."
2
Cf., e.g., the New England Confederation of 1643, William Penn's Plan
of Union for the Colonies (1697), and Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan
of 1754. These instruments are reprinted in Commager, Documents of
American History 26, 39, 43. Cf., however, article 6 of Penn's plan.
3
Nothing of the kind is found in the original league of the Swiss Cantons
of 1291, in the Union of Utrecht, the act of union between England and
Scotland under Queen Anne, or the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1815.
Newton, Federal and Unified Constitutions 41, 43, 56, 100.
'An appendix to the late John Fiske's Discovery of America prints the
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to it in English legal and public documents.'
Yet it may be noted
that no such terms are found in Glanvil's earliest formulation of
the common law of England."
The provision does not appear in the original draft of the
articles of confederation; 7 but on November 11th, 1777, a committee appointed to consider "sundry propositions" that had been
laid before Congress for suggested additions to the articles recommended, inter alia, an additional section to read as follows:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to
the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state, and . . . an action of debt may lie in
(the) (a) court of law in any state for the recovery of a debt
due on (a) judgment of any court in any other state, provided
the judgment creditor gives . . . bond . . . to (respond) (answer)
Latin text and Eden's translation of this bull in parallel columns, in part
as follows:
"Verum quia difficile foret prae"But forasmuch as it shulde bee a
sentes literas ad singula quaeque loca thynge of great difficultie for these
in quibus expediens fuerit deferri, letters to bee caryed to all suche
volumus .. . quod illarum transsump- places as shuld bee expedient, we
tis manu publici notarii inderogati
subscriptis . . . ea prorsus fides in

judicio et extra ac alias ubilibet
adhibeatur, quae praesentibus adhiberetur si essent exhibitae vel
ostensae."
(The italics are mine.)

wyll . . . that whyther so euer the
same shalbe sent, or wher so euer

they shalbe receaued with the subscription of a common notarie
therunto requyred ... the same fayth
and credite to be gyuen thereunto in
iudgement or els where, as shulde
bee exhibyted to these presentes."
5
Conjecturally, Eden's phrase may have been intended as a redundancy,
to translate the Latin "prosits," a word of emphasis. Cf. Bartolus:
"Credo tamen, quod instrumenta a tale notario confecto in territorio,
ubicunque extra territorium faciant fidem. Sic emancipatio facta coram co,
qui habet jurisdictionem a lege municipali habetur rata ubicunque ...
Praeterea, acta coram uno judice faciutnt fidem coram alio:" (Bartolus 36,
37, as printed in an appendix to Guthrie's translation of Savigny, Private
International Law, 442. Italics, mine.)
Bartolus's word "rata" might be well enough translated as "credit"
("rating"). Attesting a judicial record of Jamaica for use in court in
England early in the Nineteenth Century, a Jamaican notary public certified
that the clerk of court who had issued the copy of the record was the clerk
of the Jamaican court and that "to all acts and instruments by him signed and
attested in such his capacity as aforesaid, full faith and credit is and ought
to be given." (Appleton v. Lord Braybrook, (1817) 6 M. & S. 34, 2 Stark.
6. Italics, mine.)
Certainly British officialdom had not adopted this phrase only since the
American Revolution, in imitation of the American constitution or articles
of confederation. Our constitutional draftsmen undoubtedly used the formula
because it was a common law term with which they were familiar.
8
Leges & Consuetudines Angliae: Cf. Book VIII, which develops the
common law doctrine ot "the Record."
71 Secret Journals of the Continental Congress 283 ff. (July 21, 1775;
June 12, 1776).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

in damages . .. in case 8 the original judgment should afterwards
be reversed or set aside."

Congress next day adopted the first part of the report, ending with
the words, "the courts and magistrates of every other state," but
rejected the remainder. Yet this latter part of tile recomnmendation gives the clue to the motives of the whole proposal. The
creditor and commercial classes in the colonies had felt the pinch
of debtors absconding across colonial boundaries. Although the
several Colonies stood under common allegiance to the Crown, they
were wholly independent of each other; before about the middle of
the Eighteenth Century no court or magistrate in America had
any inter-colonial authority.' As early as 1650 a codification of the
laws of Connecticut shows an attempt to deal with the situation.',
Then on the eve of the Revolution Massachusetts passed an act "to
enable persons to . . . maintain actions of debt in the executive

courts within this Province upon judgments recovered in the neighboring governments."'"
89 Journals Cont. Cong. 887. The parentheses indicate cancellations and
interlineations in the chirographic draft of the report in the Library of
Congress.
9
Apparently certain "vice-admiralty" conrts established pursuant to the
Navigation Act of 1696 did have jnrisdiction wider than a single Colony:
Cf. 9 Pickering's Stats. at Large 428 if; Jernegen, The American Colonies
260-61, 276, 295-97.
IoUnder the title "VERDICTS:"
"That loue and peace may continue and flourish in these confoederated
colonyes ...Ordered, that any verdict or sentence of any court witlin the
colonyes, presented under authentique testimony, shall hauc a due respect
in the severall courtes of this jurisdiction, where there may bee occasion to
make use thereof, and shall be accounted good euidence for the partye, until
better euidence or other just cause appeare to alter or make the same voide:
And that in such case the issueing of the cause in question bee respited for
some convenient time, that the courte may bee aduised with, where the
verdict or sentence first passed. Provided . . . That this order shall be
accounted valid and improued onely for the aduantage of such as line within
some of the confoederated colonyes; and where the verdicts inthe courts
of this colony may receiue reciprocall respect by a like order established
by the generall courte of that colonye."
11(1774) 14 Geo. III. (Mass.), ch. 322:"Sec. 1: . . . where any person . .. shall recover judgment ...in any
court in any or either his majesty's neighboring colonies in America, and
[such judgment debtor] shall remove into or reside within this province, or
•. .acquire any real or personal estate within this province ...it shall ...
be lawful for [the judgment creditor] to ... maintain ...action . ..of
debt upon such judgment . ..in any executive court within this province
proper to try the same, in such way and manner as he ...might have done
if such judgment ...had been originally recovered in the executive court
in this province, where said action of debt shall be brought.
"Sec. 2: . . . a true copy of the record and proceedings of the ...court
...in the said neighboring colony . . ., where said judgment ...shall be
recovered, attested under the hand of the clerk of the court . . . shall be ...
as, good and sufficient evidence of such judgment, and have the same effect
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Though Congress excised all mention of the "action of debt"
from the provision inserted into the articles of confederation, that
is the only way in which inter-state enforcement of judgments has
ever been effectuated in this country. At common law it was only
thus that a foreign judgment could be made effective for the
creditor in England. The procedure had not been devised for that
purpose; nor was it confined to foreign judgments. The various
common law writs from which the modern "execution" derives
were available for only short periods of time; but after (or before)
they had expired, a new action could be brought, counting on the
judgment already obtained as a "debt" or "contract of record."
In such new action defendant might show, if he could, that no
such judgment had ever been rendered against him ("nul tiel
record"), or, that since its entry it had been paid or otherwise
discharged, as by his bankruptcy; but lie could not make any
defense grounded on the contention that although the judgment
had been taken against him it ought not to have been, i.e., that it
was "erroneous" for any reason (the so-called doctrine "res judicata"). In the technical lingo of common law pleading. defendant
could not plead "nil debet." Not only could the judgment creditor
thus bring a new action, treating his earlier judgment as a "debt,"
but he could only do precisely that (after expiration of the time
within which writs of execution could be issued) ; he was not
allowed to maintain a new action for his original claim or actual
debt. That is the concrete meaning of the doctrine of "merger":
that the original "cause of action" is extinguished by "merger"
in a (domestic) judgment once obtained upon it, so that thereafter
that judgment is the only legal claim that the creditor has.
Foreign judgments were treated somewhat differently. The
English court could know about the foreign judgment and the
proceedings that led up to it only at second-hand; and the English judges harbored a (possibly provincial) dislike and distrust of
foreign laws and procedure. So it was held that a foreign judgment did not merge the plaintiff's original cause of action; if he
chose he could disregard his foreign judgment and sue now in
England on his original claim. Yet if he did that he was often
allowed at the trial to prove that he had obtained the foreign judgment; that was competent evidence that he had a genuine and valid
claim against the defendant. But it was not always held concluand operation, as if the original and [sic!] proceedings had been rendered
and had in the court -wheresuch action of debt shall be brought .... " (Italics.
mine.)
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sive; defendant might show, if he could, that the foreign judgment
did not represent the truth and justice of the matter. Or, the
creditor if he preferred might bring his action in England directly
upon his foreign judgment, disregarding his original claim as
though the foreign judgment had merged it, as an earlier English
judgment would have done. But if the judgment creditor did that,
the defendant was still often allowed to prove that the foreign judgment ought not to have been rendered; so that whichever "form
of action" the creditor chose, his substantial position was pretty
much the same: his foreign judgment was prima facie evidence
in his favor, but not conclusive, as an earlier English judgment
would have been. 2
It will be seen that the colonial act of Connecticut already cited
did little more than state the general doctrine of the common law. 18
The Massachusetts act went further. Its terms show that it was
designed to meet two difficulties: (1) evidentiary-how shall the
creditor now prove to the Massachusetts court that he did sue
and get the earlier judgment in another colony; and (2) substantive-just what or how much advantage shall that fact give him
now, in his present Massachusetts action. And so the Act made
a copy of the earlier judgment, "attested under the hand of the
clerk of the court" that rendered it, conclusive in the later Massachusetts litigation. The action in Massachusetts was to be brought
directly upon the judgment of the other colony, as "if such judgment ...

had been originally recovered . . . in this province ;" and

such duly authenticated copy of the record from the other colony
was to have the "same effect and operation as if the original proceedings had been . . . had" in the very Massachusetts court in

which the creditor was now proceeding.'" The act thus assimilated
judgments taken in "His Majesty's neighboring Colonies" not to
foreign judgments (as judgments rendered in the Colonies and
12The rules seem not to have been fully settled at the time of the
American Revolution. Cf. Walker v. Witter, (1778) 1 Doug. K. B. 1; Hall
v. Odber, (1809) 11 East 118; Foote, Private International Law, 5th ed.,
p. 593. But a plaintiff who had sued abroad and obtained a judgment and
collected it could not sue again in England on his original claim for the
purpose of getting more than the foreign judgment had awarded him.
Barber v. Lamb, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 95, 29 L. J. C. P. 234, 2 L. T. 238.
By the same token, a plaintiff who had sued abroad and been defeated on the
facts no doubt would find the foreign judgment a conclusive bar to his later
action in England; i.e., the doctrine res judicata would be applied to a
foreign judgment against the plaintiff therein, as to the facts.
"3See ante, note 10. But note the doctrine of reciprocity imported into
the Act by its final clause. See post, note 33.
14See ante, note 11.
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overseas dependencies of the Empire were treated in England), but
to domestic (Massachusetts) judgments, yet not so as to enable the
creditor to have execution in Massachusetts directly upon the judgment of the other colony, but applying to such judgments the technical doctrines of merger and res judicata that were applied by
common law to domestic judgments. The similarity of this act to
the latter part of the committee report to the Continental Congress
grounds surmise that the members of the committee had the Mlassachusetts act specifically in mind."5 The "action of debt" upon
an earlier judgment, foreign or domestic, was perfectly familiar
common law procedure. The elision of express mention of it from
the articles of confederation did not have the effect of inhibiting
such actions; but did leave it possible to question whether the
vague term "full faith and credit" should be taken to have the substantive as well as the evidentiary purport of the Massachusetts
statute. The provision as finally incorporated into the articles of
confederation suffered from the defect that vitiated their entire
operation: there was no way of securing any uniform, nation-wide
interpretation or enforcement of it. It rested with each state in or
for its own courts to say for itself just how much and what sort
of "faith and credit" should be deemed "full faith and credit"
to the judgments of other states.'
By the time the constitutional convention met it had occurred
to some of its members that the conception of "faith and credit"
might be extended beyond the recognition of judgments from
other states. The articles of confederation require full faith and
credit only to the "records, acts and judicial proceedings of the
courts and magistrates" of other states. 17 The constitutional section is broader: full faith and credit must be given to "the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings" of every other state. The
full implications of this altered phraseology are only now coming
15See ante, note 8. The members of the committee, however, were
Richard Law, Richard Henry Lee and James Duane,-not New Englanders.
(Nov. 11, 1777). 9 Journals Cont. Cong. 887.
' 0 Reports have been found of only three cases decided under the articles
of confederation. James v. Allen, (1786) 1 Dall. (Pa.) 188; 1 L. Ed. 93;
Kibbe v. Kibbe, (1786) Kirby (Conn.) 119; Phelps v. Holker, (1788) 1
Dall. (Pa.) 261, 1 L. Ed. 128. Their general position is that the "full faith
and credit" provision had only evidentiary force, and that it remained for each
state (or its courts, on common law principles) to say for itself what effect
the foreign judgment should have on the result of the litigation now pending. The second sentence of the constitutional section was new and was
of course inserted to cure this defect. See Madison's guarded statement
(sub nom. "Publius," in Jan'y. 22, 1788) in The Federalist.
17See ante, note 1. Italics, mine.
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into clear view; but it is certain the change was made deliberately
and with something definite in mind. Neither the original "Virginia Plan" nor the "New Jersey Plan" contained any "full faith
and credit" provision. But the "Pinckney Plan" contained an
article 12, as follows:
"Full faith shall be given in each state to the acts of the legislature and to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts and
magistrates of every other state."' 8
The "Hamilton Plan," though never formally before the convention, followed more closely the final diction of the constitution:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of another."'"
On September 1st a committee recommended the following:
"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each state to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state,
and the legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner ii
which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect which
judgments obtained in one state shall have in an20
other."
Two days later the convention shortened this language to the form
in which the constitution states it. The revision made a significant
and unmistakable change in the meaning: Under the committee
report Congress might have prescribed only the effect which judgments obtained in one state should have in another; but the final
constitutional authority of Congress is to prescribe the inter-state
effect of all "public acts, records and judicial proceedings." The
purport of this change did not escape mention on the floor of the
convention. When the subject was being referred to committee
on August 29th, Madison observes:
"Mr. Wilson and Dr. Johnson supposed the meaning to be.
that judgments in one state should be the ground of action in other
states, and that acts of the legislatures should be included for the
sake of acts of insolvency, etc." t
The states had been industriously passing laws for the relief of insolvent debtors, and undoubtedly the authors of the proposal desired that any discharge pursuant to such an act of the legislature
of the state of the debtor's residence should have nation-wide
effectiveness. On September 3rd, when the committee report was
under consideration, Madison remarks:
183 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention 595, 601; 1. Id., 242.
Italics,
mine.
19 Art. 9. of the Hamilton Plan; Cf. 3 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention 617, 629.
202 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention 483-86. Italics, mine.
212 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention 447.

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

"Col. Mason favored the motion, particularly if the 'effect' was
to be restrained to judgments.... Dr. Johnson thought the amendment as worded would authorize the general legislature to declare
the effect of legislative acts of one state in another state. Mr.
Randolph was for not going farther than the report, which enables
the legislature to provide for the effect of judgmuents." 2 :
Yet the motion prevailed, to shorten and revise the report so as to
read: "the effect thereof" (i.e., the effect of "public acts, records
and judicial proceedings").
By Act approved May 26th, 1790, Congress prescribed in detail
a method for authenticating the records of one state before the
courts of another, and that such records, "authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are . . . taken.""
This formula has been repeated virtually verbatim in all the later
revisions of our federal statutes.2 4 In one respect Congress reversed the standards of the Massachusetts Act of 1774. By that
Act the judgment of a "neighboring colony" was to have the same
effect in Massachusetts as though it had been given in Massachusetts;21 but under the Act of Congress a judgment from another
state is to have the same effect in, e.g., Massachusetts, as it has
"in the courts of the state" where it was rendered. This might
have been construed to mean that without any preliminary "action
of debt" in Massachusetts the same writs of execution on such a
judgment should be directly issuable in Massachusetts that could
be issued on it in its original state. On the other hand, the careful
reader will have noted that Congress does not use the word
"effect ;" what it says precisely is that a judgment shall have "such
faith and credit" given it in other states as in its home state. This
made it possible to urge that Congress had laid down no rule of
substantive effectiveness at all, but intended only to make copies
of judgments from other states, authenticated in the prescribed
manner, conclusive evidence of the fact that they had been rendered; but leaving it still for each state to say for itself what effect
"
it would give to such judgments.*
But in its first case squarely to
22 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention 488; cf. at p. 486.
23Ch. 11, Acts of the 1st Congress, 2nd session.
2
4Cf. ch. 56, Acts of the 8th Congress, 1st session (Approved Mch. 27,
1804) ; United States Rev. Stat. sec. 905; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 687, Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 28 sec. 687.
-5See ante, note 11; and the text, to note 14.
-GAnd so held explicitly in New York, which refused effect to a judgment rendered in Vermont against a New York resident on his general
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the point the United States Supreme Court did give the judgments of each state conclusive effect throughout the country; it
also held,-rather, it took for granted-that this effect was to
be given only by bringing the common law action of debt upon
the judgment in the foreign state." No counsel at the bar of
the court are known ever to have suggested that the Act of Congress could be held to make judgments directly "executive" in other
states. Yet the idea was not unheard of. In the debates in the
constitutional convention Madison had remarked that he
"wished the legislature [Congress] might be authorized to
provide for the execution of judgments in other states . . . . He
thought that this might safely be done and was justified by the
nature of the Union. Mr. Randolph said there was no instance
of one nation executing judgments of the courts of another
nation. 8
Wherein Mr. Randolph was probably mistaken, for the procedure
is familiar to the civil law countries, which not uncommonly
make the judgments of foreign countries directly "executive" in
their own courts.2
Their willingness to do that is no doubt
largely attributable to the fact that they have all "received" the
Roman law, so that they all have the same general body of legal
doctrines and conceptions. But so our American law is all a
development of the English common law and equity jurisl)rudence.3 0 If a Minnesota judgment ought to have conclusive effect
in Wisconsin, why should that effect not be given to it in the
cheapest and most expeditious manner practicable? Foreign judgments were treated as "debts" to begin with merely from habit and
appearance and the verdict of a jury. Hitchcock v. Aicken, (1803) 1 Cairnes
(N.Y.) 460. Sed cf. Bissell v. Briggs, (1813) 9 Mass. 462, 6 Am. Dee. 88,an exceedingly interesting case. Cf. post, note 90.
27Mills v. Duryee, (1813) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481, 3 L. Ed. 411.
262 Farrand's Records of Federal Convention 448 (Aug. 29, 1787).
29
Foote, Private Int. Law, 5th ed., p. 592:"Recognition may be accorded in three ways: The foreign judgment
may be adopted by the domestic court as its own and admitted to execution
within its jurisdiction; or, it may be received as evidence of the creation
of an obligation; or, lastly, it may be received as evidence of the original
obligation, in suit brought on the primary cause of action. The first of
these methods, according to Westlake, is that generally followed on tile
continent; . . .the second is the mode adopted in England or America;
while in some few states, e.g., Sweden, Spain, Norway, the plaintiff is relegated to his original cause of action."
Direct execution seems once at least to have been awarded in England
long ago. Wier's Case (1607) cited by Thayer, International Usages-A
Step Forward, reprinted (1908) in Thayer's Legal Essays 181, 188. Apparently this case and its procedure were afterwards lost sight of.
"0With a caveat regarding Louisiana; and to a lesser extent, California
and the other states carved out of the Mexican Cession, in which Spanish
Law has had considerable influence.
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the analogy of domestic judgments; primarily the procedure was
a clumsy and expensive way of prolonging the effective "life"
of the common law judgment.31 The constitutional competence of
Congress to make the judgments of our state courts directly executive throughout the country would seem hardly open to question ;32
and the rest of the common law world is rapidly adopting that
position. A judgment taken in any foreign country or any doilfinion or dependency of the Crown which accords reciprocal
treatment to English judgments may now be "registered" in England on ex parte application and thereby becomes enforceable by
direct execution there.3 3 In the British Commonwealth of Nations
there are now three federal dominion constitutions. The South
African constitution unifies the country's judiciary and provides
that all judgments shall be directly executive throughout the
Union. 34 The Australian constitution repeats our "full faith and
credit" clause virtually verbatin,35 but it adds the further provision, that the Commonwealth (Dominion) Parliament shall have
power to provide for "the service and execution throughout the
Commonwealth of the civil and 6riminal process and the judgments
of the courts of the states ;,,36 and thereunder the Australian Par31

See ante, note 12, and the text thereto. Is there possibly discernible

here a "trade-union' interest of the English lawyers in multiplying the intricacies (and expense) of legal proceedings,--"else, the law were no mystery?" The writer is not aware that Jeremy Bentham ever turned his scalding pen to this particular point. Although a modern (domestic) judgment
is directly executive usually for ten or fifteen years, or longer, still the old
alternative of bringing a new "action of debt" upon it is commonly still
available for doubling that time. See Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 9400.
9476.3

2See Cook, Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit

Clause, (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421.
33
The pertinent legislation comprises the Administration of Justice Act
(1920), 10 & 11 Geo. V., ch. 81; and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act (1933) 23 Geo. V., ch. 13. The earlier act authorized
registration in England only of judgments taken in the British Empire outside Great Britain. The later act extends the procedure to judgments taken
in foreign countries and provides that by orders in council it may be made
gradually to supersede the earlier act within the Empire. Both acts embody
the principle of reciprocity stated in the text; and cf. the Connecticut Code
of 1650 (ante, notes 10, 13). The weight of scholarly opinion both in
England and America undoubtedly condemns this theory of reciprocity; but
it may be remarked the idea persists, both in legislation and in decision. See
Hilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95;
Union Securities Co. v. Adams, (1925) 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513.
3
4Union of South Africa Act 1909, 9 Edw. VII., ch. 9, secs. 111, 112.
35
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (63 Vict., ch. 12),
sec. 118: "Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the commonwealth
to the laws, the public acts and records and the judicial proceedings of every
state." And cf. sec. 51 (25).

3aIbid., sec. 51 (24).
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liament has provided for the summary registration in any state of
judgments taken in any other state, thereupon to be directly
executive in the registering state.37
Both the British and the Australian acts follow the old statute
of the Massachusetts Bay colony in providing that a foreign, "
judgment registered in England (or Australia) shall thereupon
have the same effect as though originally rendered there; not, as
by the terms of our own Act of Congress, the same effect that'it
has in the foreign jurisdiction that did originally render it." The
difference is substantial, and the British practice is probably preferable. The contrary provision of our American statute has not
been consistently interpreted and enforced. By the law of South
Carolina judgments were enforceable for twenty years; by the
law of Georgia its own domestic judgments were enforceable for
twenty years, but foreign judgments were to be enforceable
(suable) in Georgia only for five years. And held, by the United
States Supreme Court, that the (;eorgia statute was constitutionally applicable to a South Carolina judgment whose enforcement
was sought in Georgia, contrary as that seems to the terms of
the Act of Congress.40 On the other hand, it has been held that a
state need not give to foreign judgments the same priority, e. g., in
distribution of a decedent's estate, that it accords to the judgment'
of its own courts."
The Canadian constitution #2 unifies criminal law and procedure
throughout the Dominion but leaves civil procedure to provincial
regulation, and without obliging the provinces to give any effect to
37
Service and Execution of Process Act (1901), Part IV. The act
has been several times amended, to 1931 ; but no amendment has been found
material to any topics of this paper. As amended to 1912, the act is reprinted as an appendix to Professor Cook's article already cited (ante, note
32) ;3 cf. (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 441 ff.
6The word "foreign" is used in this paper to include other constituent
states of the same federal country, as well as foreign countries. The word
"state" will usually refer to one of the constituent members of a federal
country (the United States, or Australia) ; for a "state" fully independent
internationally the word "country" will commonly be used herein.
3923 Geo. V., ch. 13 (1933), part I., 2-(2) (a) : "A registered judgment
shall for the purposes of execution be of the same force and effect
as
if the judgment had been originally given in the registering court . . on
the date of registration ..
"
Australia Serv. and Exec. Proc. Act (1901), part IV., 21.(2): "From
the date of registration the certificate shall be a record of the court in which
it is registered, and shall have the same force and effect in all respectq
as a judgment of that court."
Cf.
ante, note 11 ; and the text, to notes 14 & 25.
40 McElmoyle v. Cohen, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 312, 10 L. Ed. 177.
41McElmoyle v. Cohen, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 312, 10 L. Ed. 177; anl
cf. Brengle v. McClellan, (1836) 7 Gill. & J. (Md.) 434.

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

the civil judgments or proceedings of the other provinces. The
Canadian provinces in this respect seem fully as independent of
each other as were the several United States before the adoption
of the constitution.43 Commissioners for uniform laws in Canada
have drafted a proposed "Uniform Foreign Judgments Act,
1933." This draft act would make judgments not directly executive in another province but only a "cause of action," following
the common law system. But it provides that the holder of a
foreign judgment, if he prefers, may sue on his original cause of
action instead of on the judgment, following thus the common
law doctrine of the non-merger of foreign judgments." Apart
from this proposed uniform act, several of the Canadian provinces
have enacted legislation regulating the standing of foreign judgments. Under these statutes in general a foreign judgment is not
conclusive; a defendant sued on a judgment obtained against him
outside the province may defend again on the merits, raising either
new defenses or defenses that he unsuccessfully interposed to the
earlier (foreign) action. But some of the acts confine this principle to actions brought on foreign default judgments or judgments not founded on personal service of the original process; or,
to defendants domiciled in the present forum. 45 Obviously the
Canadian laws and constitution integrate that country less
thoroughly in this respect than is the case with either the United
States or the other British nations, which is remarkable, for, in
general, national (dominion) authority is wider and state (provin421.e., the British North America Act of 1867, as amended; see ses.
91 (27), 92 (14).
43 The Honorable Mr. Justice Riddell of the Supreme Court of Ontario
is authority for the statement (in personal correspondence with the writer)
that "We have no constitutional limitations.... Each of the provinces is in
its judgments a foreign state. International Law governs the rules concerning them, unless there is provincial legislation in the matter." (Italics, mine.)
44The draft act is included as an appendix to the valuable monograph
by Professor Read, of the Law School of the University of Minnesota, on
the Recognition of Foreign Judgments in the British Commonwealth of
Nations at Common Law. (Conflict of Laws thesis: Harvard Law School.)
But it may be noted that the recent English statutes already cited seem to
have abrogated the common law principle of non-merger of foreign money
judgments. 23 Geo. V., ch. 13, part I, 6:
"No proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign
judgment ...to which this ...Act applies, other than proceedings by way
of registration of the judgment, shall be entertained by any court in the
United Kingdom."
45Professor Read (op, cit., pp. 146-149) cites the following provincial
statutes: Prince Edward Island, Statutes 1869, ch. 15, sec. 5; New Brunswick, General Statutes 1903, ch. 137; Manitoba, Acts 1913, ch. 46, sec. 25 (1);
Order 35 of Rule 38, sub. Nova-Scotia Acts 1919, ch. 32.
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cial) competence narrower in Canada that in this country or
46
Australia.
The Act of Congress sounds very sweeping: "The records and
judicial proceedings of the courts of any state or territory," duly
authenticated, are to have the same effect in every other state "as
they have . . . in the courts of the state from which they are

taken. ' 4 That would seem to mean that any and every-sort of
judicial proceeding to which the state in which it takes place gives
conclusive or any other definite effectiveness must be given the
same effect in every other state. But such a broad construction has
not proved tolerable. The practice of suing a non-resident defendant and attaching his property within the jurisdiction dates
back into colonial times, and had been pushed to extreme lengths.
In one such Massachusetts case the property attached comprised
one handkerchief; in another, one blanket.48 Meantime sonic
states permitted action against absent and non-resident defendants
without any attachment; on plaintiff's affidavit merely that defendant had property in the state the court would summon him
from abroad to defend the action. 40 The constitutional standitig
of such judgments was not settled until 1877. The Act of Congress purports to draw no line of discrimination between different
sorts of procedure on this or any other basis ;5o but in the famous
46
In Australia, as in the United States, the national (federal) government is the government of delegated, enumerated powers and the reserved
or residual powers belong to the states; in Canada and South Africa the
dominion (national) government is competent in all fields except those
assigned exclusively to the provinces. British North America Act 1867,
secs. 91, 92; Australia, Constitution Act 1900, secs. 51, 107; cf. Bryce,
Studies in History & Jurisprudence 409-414. Sed cf. (1932) 48 L. Quart.
Rev. 142-145.
47(1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28 sec. 687.
Cf. ante, notes 23, 24.
4SKibbe v. Kibbe, (1786) Kirby (Conn.) 119; Phelps v. Holker, (1788)
1 Dall. (Pa.) 261, 1 L. Ed. 128; cf. ante, note 16. Evidently such attachments were not made with a view to securing a fund out of which to collect
the anticipated judgment; they were conceived merely as a mode of founding
personal jurisdiction, upon which a (probably default) judgment might be
obtained which in turn would ground an "action of debt" in the defendant's
home 9state.
4 See, e.g., Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 9235(3) ; so formulated in the
Minnesota statutes as early as 1866 (Minn. Gen. Stat. 1866, ch. 66, sec. 49,
Third), and retained ever since without verbal change, though nugatory
since the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565.
5OAnd so, Kent, J., in Hitchcock v. Aicken, (1803) 1 Caines (N.Y.) 460:
"When we reflect in what manner judgments may in some instances
be obtained, as . . . by attachment of a handkerchief or blanket, it is more
favorable to . . . harmony and ... justice that the judgments of the several
states should be put on the footing of foreign judgments, than that they
should be held absolutely binding and conclusive, or as much so as they may
be by the laws of the State which authorized the proceeding; and if we may
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case of Pennoyer v. Neff default judgments taken on "foreign

attachment" were held to bind only the specific property attached
and not to be given effect inother states (nor indeed in the state
where rendered) as a general adjudication of the merits." The
decision for some time also was deemed to have stigmatized the
practice of suing an absent and non-resident defendant without
attachment as wholly unconstitutional except where the action is
brought directly for the purpose of adjudicating the parties' rights
respecting some certain property (or "status," as, e.g., a marriage)
specified in the pleadings, such as an action to foreclose a mortgage
or to quiet title.52 In such cases, as in the attachment cases, default judgment is effective only with relation to the specified
property or status, but is entitled to no generally conclusive effect
on the merits.
Under Pennoyer v. Neff the constitutional effect of a state
court's judgment has seemed to depend primarily on two facts or
questions: (1) Whether the defendant at the time the original
action was begun was actually (physically) within the state in
whose courts that action was brought, or lived in that state; or,
(2) whether the defendant then had property in that state which
either was the direct subject of the litigation or else was seized at
the beginning of the action and held in custody of the court. But
while the Supreme Court thus read a'l this into the constitution
and the Act of Congress, none of it is to be found there; and it is
no more inevitable than is the rule that a foreign judgment can
be enforced only by means of a complete new action of debt. The
courts of England during the Nineteenth Century and since have
summoned a defendant from abroad regardless of whether or not
question the binding force of the . . .judgment in one case, we may in another; for the Act of Congress has no exceptions and must receive a unifortn
construction." (Italics, mine.)
Cf. Sewall, J., (diss.) in Bissell v. Briggs, (1813) 9 Mass. 4462, 6 Am. Dec.
88. Cf. ante, note 26.
51(1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565. The decision disabled even the
state that rendered it from giving it such general effect, counting on the
"due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. A fortiori it could be
entitled
to no such effect in any other state.
52
1n such cases the specified property is deemed "brought before the
court" by the pleadings instead of by a process of physical seizure or its
analogue, "garnishment." Arndt v. Griggs, (1890) 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup.
Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918; Dewey v. Des Moines, (1899) 173 U. S. 193, 19
Sup. Ct. 379, 43 L Ed. 665; Roller v. Holly, (1900) 176 U. S.398, 20 Sup.
Ct. 410, 44 L Ed. 520; Harris v. Balk, (1905) 198 U. S.215, 25 Sup. Ct.
625, 49 L. Ed. 1023; B. & 0. Ry. v. Hostetter, (1916) 240 'U. S. 620, 36
Sup. Ct. 475, 60 L. Ed. 829; Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, (1917) 243
U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282, 61 L. Ed. 713; Thurston v. Thurston, (1894) 58
Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017.
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they have seized (actually or "constructively") specific property
of his in England; yet when asked to enforce foreign judgments in
England, they have commonly responded very much in the terms of
our own case of Pennoyer v. Neff. When pressed with the discrepancy, they have replied that they summon defendants from
abroad in obedience to Act of Parliament imposing that duty upon
them, but that it by no means follows that the judgments they
render on such procedure would be or ought to be given effect in
In other words, while summoning defendants
foreign lands.5
from abroad is authorized by England's "municipal law," the English judges do not think the practice conforms to "international
law." This seems a parochial version of international law, however; for the fact seems to be that the Roman countries,-i.e.,
pretty much the civilized world outside the "English-speaking"
countries, take a quite different view of the canonical doctrine of
international law on this point.5 ' The practice of the English
judges in summoning foreign defendants seems sounder than their
notion of international law. The Australian constitution empowers the commonwealth parliament to confer federal (nationwide) jurisdiction on the state courts ;5' and l)ursuant thereto the
Service and Execution of Process Act regulates the authority of
an Australian state court to summon a defendant from elsewhere
in the commonwealth. The upshot of it seems to Ie that the procedure is authorized whenever the litigation concerns ( I ) property
in the state, or (2) transactions that took place in the state, or,
(3) the omission to (1o something that ought to have been doie
in the state.Y Jurisdiction, that is. depends on the character of the
53
The explanation seems not entirely ingenuous. Professor Dodd points
out that the terms of the judicature act are permissive, not mandatory.
Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, (1929) 23 Ill. L..Rev. 427, 433, note 20.
Cf. Sirdar Singh v. Rajah. [1894] A. C. 670, 10 T. L. R. 62: manuel v.
Symon. [1907] 1 K. B. 302: 77 L. J. K. B. 180, 98 L.T. 304: Gujard v.
T. 293: Harris
deClermont. [19141 3 K. B. 145, 83 L. J. K. B. 1407. Il I..
v. Taylor, [1915] 2 K. B. 580. 84 L. J. K. B. 1839. Sed Cf. Phillips v.
Batho. [1913] 3 K. B. 25. 82 L,J. K. B. 882; (contra?) Redhead v. Redhead.
[1926] N. Z. L.131, 28 G. L. R. (N.Z.) 20; Rule Xl., Rules of the English
High Court.
SLorenzen. Cases on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 126. .:"Service of process within the state is not a jurisdictional requiremen
in countries of the civil law for any cause of action. If jurisdiction exists
the defendant may be cited to appear and defend, altho absent from the
state."
Cf. Pillet, Jurisdiction over Foreigners, (1905) 18 Harv. 1L.Rev. 325; Beale.
Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
•.Australia, Constitution Act 1900. sec. 71: and cf. Id.. sec. 51(24)
(ante, note 36).
-;Part II.. 11-(1) : If "(a)
"the subject matter of the suit .. .is
"(1) Land or other property situate ...within the state . .. inwhich
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litigation, regardless of whether the defendant lives or does business
or owns any property in the summoning state. The English acts
authorize registration of a foreign judgment in England if the defendant had either a residence or a business address in the original
(foreign) jurisdiction; provided, in the latter case. that the litigation was "in respect of" business so done there.' The proposed
Canadian draft act does not lay down this last limitation; but under
its terms a business address will suffice only if the summoning
jurisdiction "is a province or territory of Canada."58
the writ was issued; or

"(2) . . . stock of a corporation .
ness within that state ... or

.

. having its principal place of busi-

"(3) Any deed, will, document or thing affecting any such land, stock
or property; or
"(b) . . . any contract in respect of -:hich relief is sought . . . was
made .

.

. within that state

.

. . or

"(c) the relief sought is in respect of a breach, within that state . . .
of a contract wherever made; or
"(d) any act or thing sought to be restrained or removed, or for which
damages are sought to be recovered, was done or is to be done or is situate
within that state ...

or

"(e) at the time when the liability sought to be enforced arose . . .

Defendant..

. was within that State ...

or

"(f) the domicil of the person against whom any relief is sought in a
matrimonial cause is within that state. .. ."
"12. When a judgment is given ...

under this act, such judgment shall

have the same force and effect as if the writ had been served on the defendant in the state

. .

. in which the writ was issued."

the Administration of Justice Act 1920 sec. 9-(2), a foreign judgment shall not be registered in England if
"(a) The original court acted without jurisdiction; or
"(b) The judgment debtor, being a person who was neither carrying on
business nor ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction of the original court.
did not voluntarily appear or else submit or agree to submit to the jurisdiction of that court."
The Foreign Judgments Act 1933 provides that the original court shall
be deemed to have had jurisdiction in personam (Part I., 4. (2) (a) :
57By

"(iv.) If the judgment debtor .

.

. was

. . .

resident in, or being a body

corporate, had its principal place of business in the country of that court; or
"(v.) If the judgment debtor . . . had an office or place of business

in the country of that court and the proceedings in that court were in
respect of a transaction effected through or at that office or place ;" or, in rem
"(b) In . . . an action of which the subject matter was immovable
property, or . . . movable property if the property . . . was . . . situate inl

the country of that court;
Provided, however, that the registration "shall be set aside" if 4.,
(1) (a) (iii.) "the judgment debtor . . . did not (notwithstanding that
process may have been duly served on him) receive notice . . . in sufficient
time to enable him to defend. ."
5s"In ... personam, a court of a foreign country has jurisdiction in the

following cases only:
(a) "Where the defendant is at the timne of the comm,,encement of the
action, ordinarily resident in that country;
(b) "Where the defendant when the judgment is obtained is carrying
on business in that country and that country is a Province or territory of
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The United States Supreme Court seems to be moving-haltingly-toward the English or Proposed Canadian position. Under
Pennoyer v. Neff mere ownership of property in a state does not
subject a defendant personally to the jurisdiction of its courts.
Carrying on business in the state was early made the criterion of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations ;51but for sonic time it was
widely thought that an absent and non-resident individual could
not be summoned personally into the state simply because he carried on business there, even though the litigation concerned that
business. 60 The advent of the automobile brought about the first
distinct departure from that point of view ;"' but the matter is still
shrouded in some obscurity. In its latest pronouncement the United
States Supreme Court holds that where a state (constitutionally)
treats a definite line of business as "exceptional" and subjects it
to "special regulation," an absent and non-resident individual who
carries on that line of business in the state may be summoned personally into it for litigation growing out of that business. 02 But
"all business is subject to some kinds of public regulation.10 3 What

amount or sort of legislative regulation constitutes "special" regulation? In the case of Adkins v. Childrens Hospitdl Mr. Justice
Canada;
(c) "Where the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of that
court." (Italics, mine.)
59So also in England. Foreign Judgments Act (1933)
Part 1., 4. (2)
(a) (iv.) (ante, note 57) ; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Act. fur Motor,
etc., [1902] 1 K. B. 342, 71 L. J. K. B. 284; Act. Dampskib Hercules v.
Grand Trunk Ry., [1912] 1 K. B. 222, 81 L. J. K. B. 189.
GOQuaere as to unincorporated associations. See St. Clair v. Cox,
(1882) 106 U. S.350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222; d'Arcy v. Ketchum,
(1850) 11 How. (U.S.) 165, 13 L. Ed. 648; Flexner v. Farson, (1918) 248
U. S.289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, secs.
71-78; Minnesota v. Adams Exp. Co., (1896) 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1085;
Taylor v. Order Ry. Conductors, (1903) 89 Minn. 226, 94 N. W. 684;
Cabanne v. Graf, (1902) 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461; Dow v. First Nat'l
Bank, (1922) 153 Minn. 19, 189 N. W. 653; Ruff v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
(1927) 172 Minn. 585, 216 N. W. 331; Sugg v. Thornton, (1889) 132
U. S.524, 10 Sup. Ct. 163, 33 L. Ed. 447; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy
Pckg. Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634; Grant
v.Cananea Copper Co., (1907) 189 N. Y. 241, 82 N. E. 191; N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, (1916) 241 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613, 60 L. Ed.
1140.
61Hess v. Pawloski, (1927) 274 U. S.352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed.
1091; 2Schilling v. Odelbak, (1929) 177 Minn. 90, 224 N. W. 696.
6 Henry L. Doherty Co. v. Goodman, (1935) 294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup.
Ct. 553. For a comprehensive survey of the problem as it appeared in this
country just before that case went up, see the present writer's The Shifting
Basis of Jurisdiction, (1933) 17 MiNNaSOTA LAW REVIEW 146. Cf. Scott,
Business Jurisdiction over Non-residents, (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
-3Quoted with approval in State v. Johannes, (Minn. 1935) 259 N. W.
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Sutherland declared that legislative regulation of the terms of private contracts must rest upon "the existence of exceptional circumstances."' ° It stands admitted that money-lending is a business the terms of whose contracts may be legislatively restricted, by
usury laws. May a non-resident money-lender then be summoned
personally into the state to defend litigation arising from his moneylending there?
It may be suggested that for summoning a defendant from another state of the same federal country, different tests may well be
appropriate than for summoning defendants from countries entirely foreign. The Australian act, which disregards both residence
and place of business, applies only within that commonwealth,
while the English acts (and the proposed Canadian uniform act)
apply also to proceedings in countries wholly foreign. Within a
single federal country possessed of a fairly homogeneous legal
system it is submitted the terms of the Australian statute are not
too broad. In this country a criminal defendant may be taken for
trial into any state where it is alleged he committed the crime. Why
should not a defendant be obliged civilly to litigate his transactions
in any state where they took place or by the terms of his own
undertakings ought to have taken place? Yet Congress has not
seen fit to give the civil process even of the federal district courts
a nation-wide reach except in certain "exceptional" classes of
cases. 65 Suppose Congress now passed an act in general terms:
That any default judgment produced by summoning a foreign
defendant into the state to defend litigation concerning any business or transaction negotiated by him in the state should be entitled
to full faith and credit in other states,-would such an act be
constitutional? The constitution authorizes Congress to prescribe
the inter-state effect of judicial proceedings. Since Congress has
laid out no lines of discrimination, the Supreme Court might have
held that there are none and that the obligation of "full faith and
credit" extends to every sort of judicial proceeding that its original
state holds effective; or, that until Congress sets up standards of
discrimination each state remains free to make its own. Instead,
the court has treated the constitutional section in connection with
the fourteenth amendment as self-executing and has worked out
64(1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785.
65
Eastman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Co., (1927) 273 U. S. 359, 47 Sup.
Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684. Cf. DuBois, The Significance in Conflicts of the
Distinction between Interstate and International Transactions, (1933) 17
MiNNESoTA LAW REviEw 361.
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its rules as assumed logical ( ?) corollaries of the constitutional
obligation. If that is what they are, how much p!ay of legislative
discretion is left to Congress? Undoubtedly, here as elsewhere,
any congressional discretion must be exercised within the limits
of what the Court will regard as "reasonable," the undefinable
standard of which rests in the bosom of the Court itself. But, no
doubt, too, to be "reasonable" any such legislation will have to
follow the general distinctions already established by the Court."
It may be questioned whether an act of Congress would be sustained which, like the Australian Service & Execution of Process
Act, disregarded both the residence and the business address of the
defendant and made jurisdiction turn entirely on the character of
the litigation.
In this country a non-resident defendant who has never done
any business in the state may nevertheless he stunnmoned personally before its courts if he can be found physically within the
state, no matter how temporarily.6 , Yet the United States Supreme
Court refused effect to a French judgment taken against al
American defendant doing business in France, and not on default,
but after appearance and trial of the case."' But then the French
courts do not exclude hearsay evidence! And they do not give conOe'Although "personal" jurisdiction over foreign corporations is grounded
on their engaging in business in the state, it is also held that this jurisdiction must not be so exercised as to impose an "unreasonable" burden on
interstate commerce. Davis v. Farm. Coop. Eq. Co., (1923) 262 T. S.
312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556. 67 L. Ed. 996: L. & N. Ry. v. Chatters, (1929) 279
U. S. 320, 49 Sup. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711; D. & R. G. Ry. v. Terte (1932)
284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295. And, for the distinction between jurisdiction over foreign corporations generally, for all transitory
causes, and as confined to litigation over business done in the state, see Penn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 ..
Ed. 610; Dragon Co. v. Storrow. (1925) 165 Minn. 95. 205 N. W. 694.
In the case of Henry L. Doherty Co. v. Goodman, (1935) 294 U. S. 623.
55 Sup. Ct. 553, the Iowa statute pursuant to which defendant was sunlmoned from New York was inclusive ii terms. Any non-resident defendant
maintaining a business office or agency in Iowa might be sumnmoned from
abroad to defend litigation "growing out of or connected with the business
of that office or agency." But in sustaining the jurisdiction the United
States Supreme Court stressed the fact that the kind of business involved
in the case was one which Iowa "treats as exceptional and subjects to
special regulation. . ... Only rights claimed on the present record are determined. The limitation of [the statute] under different circumstances
we do not consider." Cf. ante, note 32.
67
Fisher v. Fielding, (1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atd. 714. The case and the
principle involved are discussed at length in the writer's, The Shifting Basis
of Jurisdiction, (1933) 17 MINNESOTA I.AW REVIEW 146. Cf. Blair, The
Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, (1929) 29
Col. L. Rev. 1.
GSHilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95.
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elusive effect to American judgments." And, of course, to the
judgment of a foreign country the "full faith and credit" section
does not apply; nor, if this case is good law at all, does the "due
process" clause. Under both the English Acts it is clear a foreign
judgment is not registrable in England, even though defendant
was personally served with process in the foreign jurisdiction, tinless at the time he was either "ordinarily a resident" or else engaged in business there. The Canadian uniform draft act takes
the same position."0 At least as between different countries certainly a good deal can be said for the sound policy of such a rile.
In Australia (and in South Africa) the problem largely disappears
in its inter-state aspect; since, if the nature of the cause of action
permits, a defendant can be summoned into any Australian state
from any other state regardless of his residence or place of business (so long as he lives within the commonwealth), there is not
much occasion to "snapshot" a defendant by catching him with
process in some state where he just happens to be at the moment.
Another procedural vice that affects the problem of "full faith
and credit" is "fraud" in obtaining the foreign judgment. Early
in the Seventeenth Century the English chancellor with the personal help of King James I established his authority to forbid the
holder of a common law judgment from ever taking any steps to
enforce it, on proof (made to the chancellor) that it was obtained
by fraud. This is a principle capable of wide extension. Every
69See ante, note 33.

7OSee ante, notes 57, 58. Cf. the Foreign Judgments Act 1933, part I.,
4.(2): That the original (foreign) court shall be deemed to have had

jurisdiction in personam if

"(i.) the judgment debtor . . . defendant in the original court, submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing . .. otherwise than for the purpose of protecting ... property seized .. . in the proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of that court; or

"(ii) if the judgment debtor was plaintiff ... or counterclaimed in the
...original court; or
"(iii.) if the judgment debtor ... had .. .agreed .. . to submit to the
jurisdiction of . . . that court; or
"(iv.) " and "(v.)" as in note 57, ante. Cf. Guiard v. deClernont &
Domer, [1914] 3 K. B. 145, 83 L. J. K. B. 1407; Harris Y. Taylor, 119151
2 K. B. 580, 84 L. J. K. B. 1839; Barber v. Lamb, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 95,
29 L. J. C. P. 234. Cf. York v. Texas, (1890) 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct.
9, 34 L. Ed. 604; West. Ind. Co. v. Rupp, (1914) 235 U. S. 261, 35 Sup. Ct.
37, 59 L. Ed. 220; Baldwin v. Tray. Mens Ass'n, (1931) 283 U. S.522,
51 Sup. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244. For the Continental (civil law) point
of view, see Lorenzen, Cases on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 126, is.:
"The Anglo-American point of view, according to which a defendant

may be sued on a personal cause of action in any state in which service
of process can be made upon him, without reference to his domicile or to the
place where the cause of action arose or the property to which it may
relate is situated, iv rejected by all other countries." (Italics, mine.)
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defeated litigant is prone to think his adversary won by fraud and
perjury; hence a voluminous (and conflicting) lore of intricate
distinctions as to the precise sorts of fraud that respectively can
or cannot be made the basis of such an equity action. Modern
statutes that broaden the grounds for direct appeal to include newly discovered evidence, surprise, accident, excusable neglect, and so
forth, would seem to leave little reason for perpetuating this item
of chancery jurisdiction; and some states seem to have abolished
it. Minnesota clings to it." Under the act of Congress a judgment is to have the same effect in other states that it has in the
state that rendered it. Enforcement is sought in State X of a
judgment given in State Y. If and to whatever extent a court of
equity in State Y under its laws could restrain enforcement of
the judgment for fraud, to that same extent it has been held a
court of equity in State X may do so, but no further. If and
to whatever extent the judgment would be invulnerable to such
attack in its home state, it must be impregnable likewise in State
X.12 Under the English Acts and the Canadian uniform draft act
a foreign judgment is not to be enforced if it appears to have
been "obtained by fraud;" apparently this is regardless of whether
it could be attacked that way in its original habitat or not." The
American rule is a literal application of the terms of the act of
Congress. It requires the Minnesota court, e.g., before which enforcement of a foreign judgment is contested for fraud, to explore
the law of the foreign jurisdiction and determine whether that
law would sustain such a contest. The English and Canadian acts
proceed on the reverse principle of giving to the foreign judgment
the effect it would have if it had been obtained in England, or in
7 1Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 9283, 9325, 9405.
72But N. B., that the judgment debtor need not bring the equity action
in State Y; he may bring it initially in State X; but semble, he can maintain it there only if a similar action would have lain in State Y, and only
for the same sort of "fraud" that would sustain it there. See Maitland ad
Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History 124; Christmas v. Russell.
(1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 290, 18 L. Ed. 475; Levin v. Gladstein, (1906) 142
N. C. 482, 55 S. E. 371; Schendel v. Chicago & Ry., (1926) 168 Minn. 152,
210 N. W. 70; Embry v. Palmer, (1882) 107 U. S. 3, 2 Sup. Ct. 25, 27
L. Ed. 346; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, (1927), pp. 461-64; (1927) It
MINNEsoTA LAw REviEw 150, 567-68.
73(1920) 10 & 11 Geo, V., ch. 91, part II., sec. 9-2(d); (1933)
23
Geo. V., ch. 13, part I., 4.(1) (iv.); Canadian (uniform draft) Foreign
Judgments Act 1933 6.(c), and cf. Id., 6.(i) :
That to an action brought on a foreign judgment it shall be a "sufficient
defence, . . . that the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were
contrary to natural justice." The Australian act contains no such provisions; see ante, notes 37, 56.
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the Canadian province in which its enforcement is now sought.
This is simpler, and as already intimated, probably preferable.'
The recognition of foreign judgments raises questions not only
about the procedure by which they were arrived at, but also regarding the nature of the relief they award or the causes of action upon
which they may have been based. The common law system of enforcing foreign judgments only by bringing "action of debt" upon
them is suited to only one type of judgment, to-wit: judgments
for the payment of money. By applying the doctrine res judicata
a common law court could give a certain indirect effect to other
foreign judgments. Whenever litigation in England turned upon
questions that had already been litigated between the parties and
embodied in a judgment abroad, even though not a money judgment, the English court could ho!d the parties concluded by the
foreign determination of those questions; and that might control
the result of the English litigation. But only a foreign judgment
for money could be directly enforced in England. This position
was fortified by the unwillingness of the common law judges to
give effect to the decrees of the English chancery. A common law
judgment always calls for "recovery" of a stated sum of money
or of some specified artice or articles of property; an equity decree
is the chancellor's personal command to the defendant to do something: to pay money, to sign and deliver a deed, to tear down a
wall,-what-not. When chancery commanded a defendant, e.g., to
sign and deliver a deed of Blackacre, the common law courts did not
recognize the decree itself as giving the (chancery) plaintiff any
rights in the land. They would continue to protect the defendant
in his possession and enjoyment of the land until he did actually
sign and deliver the deed; though when he had done that, they accommodatingly shut their eyes to the fact that he had done it only
under coercion and treated it as his free and voluntary act.7" The
chancellor's decrees were not accorded high "faith and credit" in
the common law courts of their own country.
So the English Act of 1933 makes a foreign judgment registrable and executive in England only if "there is payable thereunder
a sum of money." ' But the Act applies to other foreign judgments
74 See ante, note 11; and the text, to notes 14, 25, 39.
75It will be understood that we speak here of the traditional bifurcated
jurisprudence that obtained in England and America before the middle of
the Nineteenth Century. The codes and the modern statutes enlarging
equity jurisdiction by giving decrees force ad rem are disregarded.
76Part I., 1.-(2) (b).
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the doctrine res judicata, as suggested above. 7 Under the Canadian uniform draft act action on a foreign judgment could be defended on the ground that the judgment "is not for a sum certain
in money; ' 7s but regardless of that, "a foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon and shall not be impeached for any error of fact or law."79
The common law courts wou!d not sustain an action of debt on a
chancery decree for the payment of money. The professed reason
was that chancery decrees were not "final ;" the chancellor retained
a discretionary authority to revise or discharge his decrees at any
time on showing of a change in circumstances. Some modern
statutes limit this discretion. So in this country on a money decree
-e.g., for alimony-action can be brought in another state only for
instalments past-due; and for them only if by the law of the
original state they are beyond reach of discretionary revision."'
Otherwise our states have often regarded themselves as free from
constitutional obligation to enforce chancery decrees from other
states. But it has been said by the United States Supreme Court
that a chancery decree is entitled to "full faith and credit" by application of the doctrine res judicata. Apparently that leads to the
conclusion that if the chancellor in State Y has commanded defendant, e.g., to give a deed of Blackacre, on action brought in
State X its chancellor must treat the decree in State Y as a conclusive adjudication of the merits and so will issue a decree in the
same terms (barring any change of circumstances shown since
the decree was rendered in State Y). 8 ' Yet the traditionally dis"Part II., 8.):
"A judgment to which part I. of this Act applies or would have applied if a sum of money had been payable thereunder, whether it can be
registered . . . and whether . . . it is registered or not, shall be recognized

in any court in the United Kingdom as conclusive between the parties thereto
in all proceedings founded on the same cause of action and may be relied oil
by way of defence or counterclaim." (Italics, mine.)
Cf. Id., (3): "Nothing in this section shall .. .prevent any court in
the United Kingdom recognizing any judgment as conclusive of any matter
of law or fact decided therein if that judgment would have been so recognized before . . . this Act."
78Sec. 6. (e).
T9
Sec. 5.
&OSistare v. Sistare, (1910) 218 U. S.1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905.
SFall v. Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65;
Burnley v. Stevenson. (1873) 24 Ohio St. 474; Poison v. Stewart, (1897)
167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737; Bullock v. Bullock, (1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 561.
30 Atl. 676; Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, (1923) 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac.
973; Union Pac. Ry. v. Rule, (1923) 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. 161; Bossung
v.District Court, (1918) 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589; Peterson v. Burl.
Ry., (1932) 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823; Cole v. Cunningham, (1889) 133
U. S.107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; see Cook, Powers of Courts of
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cretionary character of equity jurisprudence stands in the way of
thorough-going acceptance of this doctrine. Undoubtedly defendant will not be committed for contempt in State X directly for
disobedience of the decree issued against him in State Y. In general, to be enforceable in State X the judgment given in State Y
must award relief of a kind that the remedial system of State X
makes available to litigants in its courts. State X stands under no
constitutional obligation to adapt its procedural system to any parEquity, (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 106; Barbour, Extra-Territorial Effect of
the Equitable Decree, (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527; Lorenzen, Application
of Full Faith & Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees, (1925) 34 Yale L. J.
591; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 477 ff. Cf. Sill v. Worsick, (1791) 1 Hy.
BI. 665; Phillips v. Hunter, (1795) 2 Hy. BI. 402; Minna Craig SS Co.
v. Chartered M. Bank, [1897] 1 Q. B. 55. 66 L. J. Q. B. D. 162; MacFarlane
v. Macartney, [1921] 1 ch. 522, 90 L. J. Ch. 314. Nouvion v. Freeman.
(1887) is an amusing case (in chancery) 37 Ch. D. 244, (in the house of
lords) (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1, 59 L. J. Ch. 337. Action was brought in
England on a Portuguese "remate" judgment,-judgment entered on summary process, somewhat analogous to our judgment by confession, but liable
to be superseded by a so-called "plenary" action (no such plenary action to
supersede this judgment had been brought in Portugal, however). The
action was resisted on the ground that the remate judgment was not "final."
In reply, the analogy was pressed upon the court, of an English common
law judgment, liable to annulment by chancery for "fraud." The English
court refused to enforce the Portuguese judgment and found substantial
distinction between it and an English common law judgment. But, said
Lord Herschel:
"Even if the analogy were complete . . . it would afford very little

assistance to your Lordships unless we could know what had been the
course adopted with regard to [English common law judgments] in countries in whose system of law the same force and effect are given to foreign
judgments as are given in the courts of this country."
Lord Bramwell said:
"I do not think any argument can be founded upon ...

the preposterous

condition of things that existed in England before the judicature acts"
[fusing "law" and "equity"] ....
I think that some twenty or thirty years
hence . . . it will scarcely be believed that such a state of things did exist in
a civilized country."
Of course no common law judgment is really final (until the statute
of limitations has run) where the chancellor has power to annul it for fraud:
nor, while still subject to appeal whereby it may possibly be reversed. Yet
common law courts hold common law judgments entitled to the benefit
of the principle of res judicata as well as suable by action of debt before
time for appeal has expired, and even though appeal has been taken, unless
by supersedeas. Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., (1877) 11 R. I. 411; Ebner
v. Steffanson, (1919) 42 N. D. 229, 172 N. W. 857, 5 A. L. R. 1261, and
note. Cf. the English Foreign Judgments Act 1933, part I., L.-(3):
"A judgment shall be deemed to be final and conclusive notwithstanding that an appeal may be pending against it, or that it may still be subject
to appeal."
But the earlier act of 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. V., ch. 81) denied English registration to an overseas judgment on showing that an appeal was pending "or
intended," part II., sec. 9.-(2) (e). And the Canadian uniform draft act
provides that action on a foreign judgment shall be stayed if it is shown
that appeal has been or is "about to be" taken, sec. 7. The Australian act is
silent in this regard.
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ticular sorts of relief that might be required for enforcement of
2

any foreign judgments.6

One country commonly does not enforce the criminal or revenue laws or sentences of another, and this rule is applied between
the several United States notwithstanding the constitutional provision. If a convict in State Y escapes into State X, he is to be
extradited back into State Y; but he is not subject to imprisonment
in State X for the unexpired term of his State Y sentence. So a
judgment given in State Y against a taxpayer for delinquent taxes
presumably will not found an action of debt in another state. This
doctrine is extended to "quasi-criminal" or "penal" obligations,
and it is held that a judgment rendered in State Y on a "penal"
obligation is not constitutionally entitled to enforcement in State
X. For this purpose a judgment apparently is penal when it
awards relief, not to a private plaintiff because of damage done him
by the defendant, but to the State or to some one such as a "common informer" who sues under statutory authority not to redress
injury sustained peculiarly by himself but as a "public representative" to "vindicate public justice." 8 This exemption of "penal"
judgments from the operation of "full faith and credit" cannot
be spelled out of the words of either the constitution or the Act of
Congress. Like the rest of our constitutional law on "full faith and
credit," it has been developed wholly judicially, giving constitutional force (and thereby constitutional sacrosanctity) to a common
law tradition. 4 The English Administration of Justice Act (1920)
82Slater
v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., (1904) 194 U. S.120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48

L. Ed.3 900; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, sec. 12.
S Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L.
Ed. 1123; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., (1888) 127 U. S.265, 8 Sup. Ct.
1370, 32 L. Ed. 239. The authority of these cases has been questioned,
largely on the basis of some remarks by Holmes, J.,in Fauntleroy v. Lmn,
(1908) 210 U. S.230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039. Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, sec. 204; Hazelwood, Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to
Enforcement of Tax Judgments, (1934) 19 Marquette L. Rev. 10. So
"infamy" produced by a sentence (judgment) of State Y ordinarily will not
be given effect in State X, e.g., to make a witness incompetent, Commonwealth v. Green, (1822) 17 Mass. 515, and a prohibition against re-marriage
incorporated in an absolute divorce decree pursuant to the law of the divorcing state has been held not to avoid the party's re-marriage after acquisition of domicil in another state. Webster v. Modern Woodmen, (1922)
192 Iowa 1376, 186 N. W. 659. Cf. State v. Yoder, (1911) 113 Minn. 503, 130
N. W. 10. It seems on this basis, in part, that enforcement of foreign chancery decrees has been refused; the coercive processes of chancery smack of
a criminal or "penal" quality. Cf. ante, note 81; especially Union Pacific
Ry. v. Rule, (1923) 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. 161; Bossung v. District
Court, (1918) 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589. Cf. post, notes 87, 88, 89.
'Yet it would seem Congress could extend the obligation of full faith
and credit to penal judgments (cf. ante, notes 32, 66), if it were thought
desirable. Cf. post, notes 85, 86-88, and the text thereto.
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does not speak of "penal" judgments; but the 1933 act provides
for registration of foreign judgments only for "a sum of money,
not in respect of taxes or ...a fine or other penalty;"" and under
the Canadian uniform draft act action could not be maintained
on a foreign judgment for "a penalty or a sum . ..due under the
revenue laws of the foreign" jurisdiction.' 6
Judgments founded on "penal" obligations are the only exception thus far recognized by the United States Supreme Court to a
general principle, that the judgment of any state court is constitutionally entitled to full faith and credit in every other state regardless of the nature of the cause of action upon which it was
based. In wider (and vaguer) terms the English Administration
of Justice Act 1920 denies registration to a foreign judgment based
on "a cause of action which for reasons of public policy or for
some other simi'ar reason could not have been entertained by the
registering court. 6' 7 And the act of 1933 provides that registration of a foreign judgment "shall be set aside" if "the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in the
country of the registering court ;"SS while under the Canadian uniform draft act action on a foreign judgment could be defended
if it is "in respect of a cause of action which for reasons of public
policy or for some similar reason would not have been entertained
by the courts of this Province." '
The Australian Service and Execution of Process Act does not
except penal judgments nor any other class of judgments from
the scope of the "full faith and credit" obligation. Judgments and
decrees are registrable and executive throughout the commonwealth whether they are money judgments or not. It is submitted
this is as it should be, between states of the same federal country.
Between wholly independent countries different considerations may
well control.
In the early Massachusetts case of Bisscll v. Briggs, Sewall J.,
dissenting, posed several situations in which he held it unfair to
require Massachusetts to enforce foreign judgments."0 The people
"5Part I., 1.-(2) (b).
S6Sec. 6.(f).
s7Part
II., sec. 9.-(2) (f).
88Part 1., 4. (1) (it) (v.).

s9Sec. 6(h) ; and cf. sec. 6(i) (ante, note 73).

In the case of Boyle

v. Victoria Trading Co., (1902) 9 B. C. R. 213, British Columbia refused
to enforce a default judgment entered abroad against a corporation on a
complaint that the British Columbia court deemed patently demurrable,
counting on an ultra vires transaction.
90(1813) 9 Mass. 462. A Massachusetts sheriff under legal proceed-
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of State X, let us say, deem high interest rates oppressive and have
a stringent usury law. Judgment has been duly obtained in State
Y upon a note including interest, e.g., at 3% per month. Now
action is brought in State X upon this judgment procured in State
Y. Must State X allow this judgment as a valid debt, interest
and all? The question will become more acute if it be assumed
further that the defendant is a citizen of State X and borrowed
the money there, to be there repaid, so that if tile original action
on the note had been brought in State X recovery would unhesitatingly and properly have been refused. Although State X would
not have given judgment on the note, must it now award judgnent
on the judgment that has been entered on the note in State Y ? In
this country apparently it must. Mississippi has been required to
enforce a judgment rendered in Missouri on a gambling transaction that had taken place in Mississippi and was illegal under the
laws of Mississippi; and generally where state Y has given judgment for the plaintiff, it seems that State X must allow that judgment conclusive effect as a cause of action in its own courts although it would not have given judgment on the original ("primary") cause of action,°r-excepting only "penal" judgments.
as already noted.
Yet "the essential nature and real foundation of a cause of
ings in Massachusetts had seized personal property belonging to the (subsequent) plaintiff. Later, the sheriff being found temporarily in New Hampshire, the plaintiff sued him in New Hampshire court in trespass de bonis
asportatis; and although the sheriff appeared and defended, the New Hlampshire court gave judgment against him. Then the plaintiff sued the sheriff
again, in Massachusetts now, on his New Hampshire judgment. Defendant
offered to convince the Massachusetts court that the New Hampshire judgment was erroneous and that he had really acted properly under the laws of
Massachusetts, whose official he was and to whose courts of course liewas
officially responsible. But the Massachusett court refused to examine that
question and held the New Hampshire judgment conclusive against him.
Mr. Justice Sewall dissented vigorously that to enforce this New Hampshire
judgment
"is to administer our own laws by the intervention of a court in New
Hampshire, who have no official cognizance of our laws or officers ...
Other suggestions might be made, of cases arising under laws esteemed ...
against public faith, or against good morals, or judgments recovered against
positive regulations within the state to which they arc brought to be enforced . . . for instance, judgments upon usurious or gaming contracts.

illegal and void where made, but which may happen to be recovered where
no such restraints are recognized."
Mr. Justice Sewall's prescience will be appreciated in the sequel.
91
Fauntleroy v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Eld.
1039; Roche v. McDonald, (1928) 275 U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed.
365; Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, (1920) 252 U. S.411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64
L. Ed. 638. However, State X may not be obliged to "furnish a court"
competent to try such an action as the plaintiff's. Anglo-Am. Prov. Co. v.

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

action, indeed, are not changed by recovering judgment upon it." ' :
Those words were uttered by the United States Supreme Court
to excuse State X from enforcing the "penal" judgments of State
Y; but why are they not equally appropriate to any judgment"
just why should a foreign judgment entered on an immoral transaction be constitutionally sacrosanct above one founded on a
"penal" obligation? It is submitted ethical justification of the rule
must rest upon the answer to an anterior question: Was Missouri
constitutionally free to give the judgment that it did, on the Mississippi gambling transaction? Suppose the original Missouri decision had been appealed to the United States Supreme Court:
Could it have been reversed for the failure to apply the law of
Mississippi to the situation? If so, then the defendant not having taken such appeal but having permitted the unconstitutionally
erroneous Missouri judgment to become final, it may well enough
be treated as conclusive against him in the later Mississippi litigation. Defendant has made his own bed and should lie in it. But
if Missouri was constitutionally free to give judgment for the
plaintiff on the Mississippi gambling transaction in the teeth of the
l.ws of Mississippi, then it is outrageous to say now to Mississippi:
You must nevertheless give full effect to that Missouri judgment.
To this point of view two answers have been made. It is urged
that when a court decides erroneously it is the fault of the defeated
party (his counsel) : If the case had been competently presented
presumab'y the court would have decided properly. That is a large
assumption. In Fauntleroy v. Lunt the defendant did his best in
the Missouri court to procure proper application of the law of
Mississippi, without success. True, in all litigation one is at risk
of erroneous decision; yet there must be an end to litigation.
Nevertheless, when a citizen of State X shows to its court that his
rights under its laws have been flouted by decision in State Y, the
argument appeals with great force to the home court that it ought
to give its own citizen his rights under his own laws and the law
properly applicable to his transaction, notwithstanding the erroneous foreign decision. The very fact that he tried to make tht
court of State Y see the light, but it would not, seems an additionDavis Pr'ov. Co., (1903)

191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225;

Chambers v. B. & 0. Ry., (1907) 207 U. S. 142, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed.
143; Douglas v. N. Y. & C., Ry., (1929) 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355. 73 L.

Ed. 747; Broderick v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589. Cf.
ante, note 82, and the text thereto.
92Per Gray, J., in Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup.
Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123.
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al reason why his own state's court now should do him justice.",
Again, it is urged that the several United States should not
assume a "holier than thou" attitude toward each other. It is not
to be assumed that the law of any one of the United States, applied
to any state of facts whatever, will produce a result that ought to
seem to any other American state too shocking to be tolerated.'
This contention has plausibility. Yet certain states are beginning
or proposing to legalize gambling, which is widely regarded as a
major social and moral evil. Certainly the ideas current in tile
several states as to what constitutes gambling differ materially, as
the case of Fauntleroy v. Lue shows. The views prevailing in the
several United States as to the moral and social bearings of the
liquor traffic have varied and still vary widely. It seems all a
bootlegger in the "bone driest" state need do is to manage somehow
to reduce his bill to judgment in some other state, and then he can
enforce it in the state where he made his sale in defiance of its
law and policy. Unless the "wet" states can constitutionally be
inhibited from giving judgment to the bootlegger in such a case,
the "dry" state where he made his illegal sale cannot in any fairness be required to enforce the judgment.
So it is submitted the whole matter comes back to tile question
of State Y's constitutional obligation to apply the law of State X
93

So in the case of The Helena, (1801) 4 Ch. Rob. 3, the British Admiralty, giving effect to a piratical act of the Dey of Algiers, remarked:
"Had there been any demand for justice in that country on the part
of the owners, and the Dey had refused to hear their complaint, there might
perhaps have been something like a reasonable ground to induce the court
to look into the transaction."
And in the case of Wolf v. Oxholm, (1817) 6 M. & S. 92, 106, Lord Ellenborough, refusing to recognize proceedings that had been had in the Danish
court, declared:
"The parties went into that court expecting justice, according to the
then existing laws of the country, and are not bound by the quashing of their
suit in consequence of a subsequent ordinance not conformable to the usage
of nations; which therefore they could not expect, nor are they or we bound
to regard :"
Cf. Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, 8th ed., 259:
"If an English merchant's goods be spoiled [i.e., stolen] and ... taken
beyond the seas by merchants strangers, and the English merchant was
beyond Sea to have justice & restitution made thereof, and could not obtain the same . . . now . . . if the merchants strangers shall come into . . .
England ... the English merchant shall have a writ ... to arrest them ......
In Novelli v. Rossi, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 757, 9 L. J. 0. S. K. 13. 307, and
Simpson v. Fogo, (1863) 1 Hem. & M. 195, 32 L. J. Ch. 249, the English
courts refused to honor foreign judgments though the defeated parties had
appeared and contested the cases in the foreign courts; the United States
Supreme Court did likewise in Hilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16
Sup. 94Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95. Cf. ante, notes 68, 69 and the text thereto.
See Beach, Inter-State Enforcement of Vested Rights, (1918) 27
Yale L. J. 656.
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in litigation whose result that law ought to control. It has been
noted that the framers of the constitution significantly changed the
"full faith and credit" provision of the articles of confederation,
with this very point in mind. 5 Just what is-what ought to bethe scope of this obligation?
A court of State Y considering a transaction that took place
elsewhere can take any one of three positions: (1) it can dismiss
the case "without prejudice," because the facts are foreign; (2)
retaining jurisdiction, it can brush aside the foreign law as immaterial (or, as unascertainable by it) and decide the case as
though the facts had happened in State Y; (3) it can undertake to
decide the case according to the foreign lav of the place where the
facts occurred. Historically these three positions have been taken,
in about that chronologic order. Originally the common law courts
would entertain only litigation arising out of facts transpired in
England. This rule was compelled by the fact that the earliest
jurors were witnesses rather than impartial hearers of evidence;
hence a case could practicably be tried only by a jury drawn from
the neighborhood where the facts had occurred. As the function
of the jury gradually shifted, the reason for the rule, and finally the
rule itself, largely disappeared,9 6 and, indeed, under modern conditions it would be wholly impracticable. But obviously the whole
difficulty under discussion is an outgrowth of the development of
the "transitory" cause of action, which our courts have carried
to an extreme. By and large the evidence of what took place is
likely to be most cheaply and readily available where it took place,
and the courts of that country are in the best position to interpret
and apply its law to the case. These considerations influence "civil
law" doctrine. Our courts will try a case between an Italian and a
Japanese concerning occurrences in Germany. The French courts
would decline to entertain such litigation; and it can cogently be
urged that our courts might well do likewise.97
95Cf. ante, notes 17-22, and the text thereto. For Australia, cf. ante,
note 35.
9
6See Story, J., in de Lovio v. Bait, (C.C. Mass. 1815) 2 Gall. 398, 7
Fed. Gas. No. 3776, at p. 426; Scott, Fundamentals of Civil Procedure, ch.
1, pp.97 18 ff.
See Bossung v. District Court, (1918) 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589;
Boright v. Chicago & R. I. Ry., (1930) 180 Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457; Peterson v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., (1932) 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823; Pillet,
Jurisdiction over Foreigners, (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 325; Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
Fitzherbert (cf. ante, note 93) at the end of the Middle Ages represents
a transitional position:
"If an English merchant be robbed

. . .

by merchants strangers and ...
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The fact that the Court can take any of these three positions
shows that the problem is not to be solved by logical deduction
from the political doctrine of "sovereignty." If State Y is a fully
"sovereign" state, its "sovereignty" in this connection means simply
that it is "king in its own courts ;" it "may attach any legal consequences whatever to any state of facts whatever, including acts
done in other countries even by persons not citizens or resident,%,
of" State Y.98 No settled principles of "international law" iipose any definite constraint upon state Y in this regard. In 1927
the case of the Steamship Lotus came before the Permanent Court
of International Justice.09 A French steamer and a Turkish ship
had collided in the Aegean Sea, sinking the Turkish ship and killing eight Turks on board her. Her captain and others were rescued
by the French steamer, which then proceeded to Istanboul. There
the Turkish authorities arrested both the Turkish captain and the
French sailing-master and prosecuted them jointly for manslaughter in the Turkish courts and convicted and sentenced them both.
The Turkish penal code (said to be a verbatim transcript of the
Italian code) provides that any damage clone to a Turk by a
foreigner abroad by any act which if done in Turkey would be
criminal there shall be deemed a crime and punishable as such by
the Turkish courts. The French Government protested the Turkish prosecution of the French master and brought the case before
the World Court for a judgment whether the Turkish prosecution
was "conformable to the principles of international law," and. if
the merchants strangers shall come into .. . England . . .the English mer.But it seemeth the
chant shall have a writ . . . to arrest them .......

English merchant shall not have such writ for any debt due to him . ..
from a merchant stranger upon a contract made beyond the seas, if the
merchant do come into England,"
as quoted (in translation) by Story, J.,inde Lovio v. Boit, (C.C. Mass.
1815) 2 Gall. 398, 422, Fed. Cas. No. 3776. Fitzherbert's original NormanFrench text was published in 1553.
The case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1775)

1 Cowp. 161, is often cited as

the foundation of the modern doctrine of the "transitory" cause of action. It
may be noted that the difficulties of treating the action of trespass quare
clausum as local rather than transitory would disappear under the Australian

and civil-law principles of jurisdiction. Cf. ante, notes 54, 56; Scott, Fun
damentals of Civil Procedure (ante, note 96.), ch. I; Little v. Chicago.

etc., Ry., (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846.

OSThe quotation is from Professor Cook in (1918) 28 Yale L. J. 69.
Cf. Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., p. 9:
"The English courts might . . . decide every matter . . . whatever the

cause of action and wherever it arose, solely with reference to the local law

of England, and hence determine the effect of things done in Scotland or in
France exactly as they would do if the transactions had taken place between
Englishmen in England."
-gPublications of the Court, Series A, Judgment No. 9.
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not, praying indemnity to be paid to France by Turkey. By an
equally divided bench the court decided in favor of Turkey. Under
the terms of the Turkish code an act done in France by a Frenchman might be held a violation of Turkish law and so punished in
the Turkish courts (if the luckless Frenchman were ever caught
in Turkey), though perfectly lawful by the law of France whose
citizen he was and where he acted. Whether such a broad application of Turkish law could be deemed "conformable to the principles of international law" seemed doubtful to several of the
judges; and Mr. John Bassett Moore, the American member of the
bench, dissented expressly on the ground that it was not and that
the terms of the "compromis" submitting the case to the court
required it to decide that question and not to justify the particular
Turkish prosecution on any other or narrower ground. The judges
also discussed the analogy-or lack thereof-between the instant
collision and the hypothetical case so familiar to all law school
students of a man standing in the United States close to the international boundary and shooting a man standing just over the line
in Canada or Mexico. Mr. Justice Moore was prepared to concede that Turkish law might be applied to the principal case on
the ground that the French master's (allegedly reckless) navigation of his ship "took effect" in and upon the Turkish vessel, which
on the high seas was to be deemed a part of Turkish territory.10,
But the president of the court (whose opinion, the bench being
equally divided, became the court's decision) swept all this aside
by pointing out that in the last analysis-on the basis of actual
"physical power" 01-the "territoriality" of Turkey's "sovereignty" means no more than that she cannot execute her own process
on foreign soil. She could not have sent her own police into
France, there themselves to arrest the French shipmaster and without a "by your leave" to the French Government bring him to
Turkey for trial ;102 but that is not to say that Turkey cannot de10 °Crapo v. Kelly, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed. 430; and cf.
the writer's Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional
Law, (1931) 15 MiNNESOTA LAw REvmw 161, 172-175.
'oHolmes, J., "the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," in McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608; and
cf. the present writer's The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction, (1932) 17 MIN.NESOTA LAw REvimv 146.
1o-AIthough that very thing has been done (not between France and
Turkey, but between the United States and Peru) and has been sustained
by the United States Supreme Court as no denial of constitutional "due
process." Ker v. Illinois, (1886) 119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225, 30 L Ed.
421. Cf. Mahon v. Justice, (1887) 127 U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 32 L.
Ed. 283; sed cf. United States v. Rauscher, (1886) 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup.
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clare and enforce in Turkey any legal consequences she may see
fit to attribute to any acts, wheresoever and by whomsoever performed.
When the "operative facts" all occurred in State (or country)
X, it has the look of a straightforward application of the "territorial" theory of sovereignty and jurisprudence to say that the
legal consequences of those facts, wherever litigated, should be
determined according to the law of State X. In those cases also
the argument sounds cogent that the facts had better be litigated in
the courts of State X and that other courts ought to decline to take
jurisdiction. 10 3 The United States Supreme Court-especially
when speaking through the mouth of Mr. Justice Holmes-has
been wont to insist strongly on this view of the normal "territoriality" of law and its applicability, although the United States Government (and the Supreme Court for it) insists upon its own "jurisdiction" to control the legal consequences both of acts clone within its boundaries, by whomsoever performed, and also of acts
done by its citizens, wheresoever performed.' 0 4 But it is perfectly
possible for an action to be brought in an American court against
an American citizen by an Englishman, arising from events that
occurred partly in the United States, partly in England, and partly
in Norway-and even, partly in other places. In such a case the
Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425; and cf. Lascelles v. Georgia, (1892) 148 U. S. 537,
13 Sup. Ct. 687, 37 L. Ed. 549. Contrast the tender solicitude with which the
Court has protected the rights of an accused whose incriminating papers
the government has obtained by illegal search and seizure. Weeks v. United
States, (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652. The French
Government of the First Republic asserted (and exercised) a right to try
and decide prize cases in foreign ports, commissioning its consuls as prize
courts therefor. It will be remembered that President Washington steadfastly refused to tolerate exercise of this jurisdiction in the United States,
notwithstanding the insistence of the French minister, "Citizen Genet." 5.
Moore, Dig. Int. Law 591-92, and the British Admiralty refused to recognize the validity of such French condemnations. The Flad Oyen, (1799)
1 Ch. Rob. 135; The Kierlighett, (1800) 3 Ch. Rob. 96; The Christopher,
(1799) 2 Ch. Rob. 209; The Henrick & Maria, (1799) 4 Ch. Rob. 43.
103 See ante, note 97, and the text thereto.
10 4Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 347, 29
Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826; Cuba Ry. v. Crosby, (1912) 222 U. S. 473, 32
Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed. 274; Spokane Ry. v. Whitley, (1915) 237 U. S. 487,
35 Sup. Ct. 655, 59 L. Ed. 1060; N. Y. Cent. Ry. v. Chisholm, (1925) 268
U. S. 29, 45 Sup. Ct. 402, 69 L. Ed. 828; Blackmer v. United States, (1932)
284 U. S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252, 76 L. Ed. 375; Cook v. Tait, (1923) 265 U. S.
47, 44 Sup. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895. Cf. the present writer's, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law, (1931) 15 MINNESOTA
LAW REvimw 161, 171, 172, and notes 54, 55. Cf. Sill v. Warsick, (1791)

1 H. B1. 665; Phillips v. Hunter, (1795) 2 H. BI. 403; Minna Craig SS.
Co. v. Chartered Bank, (1896) 66 L. J. Q. B. D. 162; Cunard SS. Co. v.
Mellon, (1923) 262 U. S. 100, 43 Sup. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894.
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"territorial" logoscope affords scant help.'

In any case our hypo-

thetical court of state Y litigating transactions occurred in state
(or county) X seems perfectly free internationally; only its obligations under the United States constitution can constrain it to apply
the law of State X to the case, and its constitutional obligations cannot be worked out by adopting any rules of international law as the
rules of constitutional law, nor by Euclidean reasoning from a postulated "territoriality" of the "sovereignty" of state X or state Y.
The constitutional rules (if any) can only be rules of ethics, policy,
convenience, that may be deemed suitable between states that are
members of the same federal country. So under the constitutional
section Congress may "prescribe the effect" which "the public acts"
of state X shall have in state Y. It is for Congress to set the bounds
of the "legislative jurisdiction" of the several states. But Congress
has not done so. The federal statutes provide a method of authenticating copies of "the acts of the legislature of any state or territory ;"
but it is only the "records and judicial proceedings of the courts"
of the states which Congress has said "shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United States as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which
they are taken."'0 6 The most "logical" position for the Supreme
Court would seem to be to hold that until Congress prescribes the
' 05 See Cook, Logical & Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, (1924)
33 Yale L. J. 457; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy & the Conflict of
Laws, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 736; Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign
State, (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 341; de Sloovere, The Local Law Theory
and Its Implications, (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 421; Heilman, Judicial
Method and Economic Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, (1934) 43 Yale
L. J. 1082. It is of course this class of cases that raises the problem of
"the renvoi." If all the "operative facts" that are in litigation in State Y
occurred- in State X, to say that the State Y court should decide "according
to the law of State X" is tantamount to saying that the State Y court
should decide the case just as the courts of State X presumably would decide
it if it had been litigated there. In such a case it seems the most obvious
justice to say that wherever the facts happen to be litigated the result should
be the same, which can mean only that it should be "according to the law of
State X." But suppose the facts happened partly in State X, partly in State
Y and partly in State Z. Now to say that the State Y court should decide "according to the law of State X" becomes ambiguous. It may mean
either that it should decide as the State X courts would decide similar
facts all occurred in State X; or it may mean as the State X courts would
decide this very state of facts, which might perchance be "according to
the law of" State Y-or of State Z. To take as a guide the "territoriality"
theory of "sovereignty" is to follow an ignis fatuus. See Yntema, The
Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, (1928) 37 Yale L J. 468; Guar.
Tr. Co. v. Hannay [1918] 2 K. B. 623, 87 L. J. K. B. 1223, 9 Br. Rule Cas.
260.
106(1928) 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 687, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28,
sec. 687.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

"extra-territorial" effect of state legislation, there is none as a matter of any constitutional obligation, and in some early cases the
Court expressed that point of view. 10 7 But it has abandoned that
attitude and now says that "it is unavoidable that this Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may
qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another."""
The shift has come about partly unconsciously (at first), partly
in response to the persuasiveness of counsel interested for the advantage of their clients to expand the scope of the "due process"
clause.' 9 The statement made by the present writer in an earlier
volume of this REVIww that "the question: 'By the law of what
jurisdiction shall the rights and liabilities of parties to given acts
and events be determined?' is a federal question generally speaking,
under the due process clause, and in many cases also under the
full faith and credit clause" has been fully justified since it wa,
made, if it had not been already. "' But even more than in connection with judgments, the outline of the final rules on this subject
is still sadly blurred.
In the case of The Halley the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council held that facts which occurred abroad are not suable in
England unless the same facts, if they occurred in England, would
found an action there."'
The several United States have been
more liberal. Generally they have enforced such "foreign-created
rights" even when the same facts occurring within their own
borders would have created no rights there, unless to do so
shocked their moral sensibilities or seemed counter to some strong
10'"The most defendant can say is, that the state court made a inistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws. . . . But that, being
purely a question of local common law, is a matter with which this Court
is not concerned." Brandeis, J., in Kryger v. Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S.
171, 176,
37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229.
08
Per Stone, J., in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Coni.,
(1935) 294 U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518.
109It is not intended here to censure the Court for having changed
its position. Congress not having legislated, perhaps the Court had to.
from sheer necessity of "some accommodation of conflicting interests" of
parties claiming rights under the laws of different states, both apparently
applicable to the situation (the quotation is from Mr. Justice Stone's opinion
in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Com., (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct.
518; cf .ante, note 108.) Yet it is not clear why the Court could not have
left each state free in this regard until Congress should choose to act.
Congress might thereby have been stimulated. Whether such legislation
would have been advantageous in advance of any judicial development of
the subject
may be open to question; cf. post, notes 131-136, 144, and text.
1"0 Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law,
(1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW RmwIw 161, 178; cf. Ibid., at pp. 180, 181,
and notes 90-94.
111(1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 37 L. J. Adm. 33, 18 L. T. 379.
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local public policy or "injurious" to their own citizens.":

Consl-

monly they have supposed that they are the final judges of their
own policy in this respect and that they enforce any "foreign
rights" only by "comity" and not under constitutional obligation."'
When a court is considering foreign facts, it is one thing for it to
say: "We will not award recovery, although by the foreign law of
the place where the facts happened they would constitute a cause
of action;" it is quite another thing to say: "We will award recovery though by the lex loci these facts do not constitute an),
cause of action at all." In general an American state may take the
former position, but not the latter one. The distinction has been
emphasized and reiterated by the United States Supreme Court,
and, it is submitted, is both rational and ethical. By refusing recovery the court leaves the parties where it found them, and its
judgment may be regarded in other states "as not on the merits,
but rather as in the nature of a non-suit, leaving the plaintiff free
to pursue the defendant again in any jurisdiction that may entertain the action and be willing to enforce the claim.""' But if the
court gives judgment for the plaintiff, it has not left the antecedent
situation undisturbed; it has now subjected the defendant to "irremediable liability," and "this may not be done.""' This judgment
may be collected in the state that rendered it; otherwise, it constitutes in itself a new cause of action which under the "full faith
li 2Herrick v. M. & St. L. Ry., (1883) 31 Minm. 11, 16 N. \V. 413;
Powell v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. \\. 1017;
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198;
Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212 Iowa 454, 236 N. W. 399; Slattery v.Hartford Tr. Co. (1932) 115 Conn. 163, 161 AtI. 79; F. & M. Nat'l Bank v.
Anderson, (1933) 216 Iowa 988, 250 N. W. 214; Personal Finl. Co. v. Gilitsky
Fruit Co., (1934) 127 Neb. 450, 255 N. W. 558; Ulman & Co. v. Magill,
(1923) 155 Ga. 555, 117 S.E. 657; Union Tr. Co. v. Grosman, (1917) 245
U. S.412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368; No. Pac. Ry. v. Babcock (1894)
154 U. S.190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38 L. Ed. 958. The writer is not aware that
the rule of The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 37 L. J. Adm. 33. 18 L.T.
879, has been overruled or disapproved in England; but some more recent
English cases have reached the same result on the narrower ground usually
taken in this country. Kaufman v. Gerson, [1904] 1 K. B. 591. 73 L J.
K. B. 320, 4 Br. Rul. Cases 414; Eitel Bieber Co. v. Rio Tinto Co..
[1918] A. C. 260, 87 L. J. K. B. 531, 8 Br. Rul. Cases 734. Cf. Macrarlane
v. Macartney, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, 90 L. J. Ch. 314.
"13It has been urged that the word "comity" has no proper place in discussion of the conflict of laws. Generally speaking it is proper to say that
any "comity" involved is that of the state (or country), rather than of the
court. Without prejudice to the controversy, the word is used here-as the
text shows-merely as an antonym for "constitutional obligation."
"14(1931) 15 MINEsaOrA LAw REvIEw 161, 162, 163 and note 10.
"15 Brandeis, J., in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S.
145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026.
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and credit" clause every other state (including the state where the
facts took place) must honor and enforce.
To speak of a case as involving either "foreign" or "domestic"
facts is indeed to cast the problem in far too simple terms. As
already noted, it may involve operative facts partly domestic and
partly foreign, and perhaps concerning more than one foreign
jurisdiction. 116 But however mixed and miscellaneous in geographic incidence, in general it is believed one of the United States
may decline to give effect to the facts as a cause of action by treating them as though they were all domestic facts and so applying
to them its own domestic rules of law-for that purpose the forum
may evaluate its public policy for itself; but if the state gives judgment for the plaintiff by applying its own domestic rules in derogation of the law of all or some of the other states or countries
whose law might be thought relevant to the total situation, the
United States Supreme Court will consider whether the forum had
sufficient "governmental interest"1 1 7 in the situation, or sufficiently
vital connection with the operative facts, to justify its "choice of
law." For this purpose the "public policy" of the state is subject
to indubitable constitutional constraint. But the Court as yet has
worked out no standards in terms permitting much concrete prediction. It is cautiously feeling its way. " ' In the case of Broderick
11
176See

ante, note 105, and text thereto.
' The phrase is Mr. Justice Stone's in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind.
Com.,118(1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 518. The italics are the present writer's.
1n Bradford Elect. Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup Ct.
571, 76 L. Ed. 1026, New Hampshire was held incompetent to award workmen's compensation according to its own law in conflict with the statute of
Vermont, deemed by the United States Supreme Court to be the properly
applicable law, and in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, Texas was disabled from
applying its own law against the law of Mexico, (1930) 281 U. S. 397,
50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926. But in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Com.
(1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 518, California was permitted to apply its own workmen's compensation statute, regardless of the Alaska statute also relevant
to the situation, and in that case Mr. Justice Stone (pro Curia) said:
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own
statutes. . . . One who challenges that right because of . . . the conflicting
statute of another state assumes the burden of showing ... that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of
the forum. It follows . . . that the statute of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of another state both at home and abroad; and
again, that the two conflicting statutes may each prevail over the other at
home." Here, California's "interest is sufficient to justify its legislation.
• . . No persuasive reason is shown for denying to California the right to
enforce its own laws in its own courts." (The italics are mine.)
In Young v. Masci, (1933) 289 U. S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, 77 L. Ed.
1158, New Jersey was allowed to apply its own law regardless of the
law of New York, but in Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S.
202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269, South Carolina was declared incompetent to impose liability according to its own law in the teeth of the law of
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v. Rosner" 9 the New York receiver (and "statutory successor")
of an insolvent New York State bank brought action in a New
Jersey court against stockholders of the bank there resident, for
their double liability under the New York statutes. A New Jersey
statute decreed:
"No action shall be maintained in . . . this state against any
stockholder ... of any domestic or foreign corporation . . . to enforce any statutory personal liability of such stockholder . . .. if
such ... liability ...arise from the statutes or laws of any other
State or foreign country ;"
except under restrictions which the United States Supreme Court
deemed prohibitive and hence arbitrary and unreasonable. Obeying
their own statute the New Jersey court refused recovery; but the
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, which it held
denied full faith and credit to the law of New York. This decision
required New Jersey to award recovery against its own citizens
on New York facts because by the New York law they constituted
a cause of action, and thus appears to impeach the distinction we
have been discussing. But it may be noted that the liability here
was contractual-at least, "voluntarily assumed" by the defendants;
New Jersey law of course recognizes the general principle of the
enforcibility of contracts, and this particular and limited exception
(refusing to enforce this narrow class of foreign contracts) apparently "shocked the moral sense" of the United States Supreme
Court. If the insolvent bank had been a New Jersey bank, the
stockholders in all probability would have been liable by New
Jersey law. In other words, the same facts occurring in New
Jersey would have constituted a cause of action there. But suppose
the whole principle of stockholders' double liability were repugnant
to New Jersey law and policy: Does the Supreme Court mean to
say that New Jersey would have to enforce a foreign liability of
stockholders that it would not enforce against stockholders of its
own banks? Suppose one of the United States by statute should
enact the rule of The Halley 20 : that no action should be maintained in its courts on any foreign facts which if they had occurred
Georgia.

That case is equivocal, however; the defendant %wasand always

had been a non-resident of South Carolina, and he had a Georgia judg-

ment to rely upon. See Stone and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting. Cf. Penn. Ry.
v. Hughes, (1903) 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L Ed. 268; Clark v.
Willard, (1935) 292 U. S. 112, 54 Sup. Ct. 615, 78 L. Ed. 1160. Cf. the
writer's Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law,
(1931) 15 MINEo-rA LAw Ravmw 161, 172 ff, 179-181.

l9(1934) 112 N. J. L. 309, 170 Atl. 214; (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55
12 See ante, note 111.

Sup. Ct.
0 589.

MINNESOTA LA-IWV REVIEW

within the state would not constitute a domestic cause of actionsul)pose one of the United States should re-enact the medieval rule
and forbid its courts to litigate foreign facts at al'--would either
such statute be unconstitutional? It is submitted the case of
Broderick v. Rosner goes no further than to hold that a state may
not deny recovery on foreign facts when its own dlomestic law
would award recovery on parallel facts occurring within its own
borders. The case does not purport to overrule the many cases that
have stressed the general distinction between awarding and denying
recovery on foreign facts,-explicitly recognized also in sonie of
the court's most recent pronouncements.' 1
But ought the dis': 1 Mr. Justice Brandeis's opinion (pro curia) in Broderick v. Rosner,
(1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, seems far from clear.
"The power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its
courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard therein is
subject to the limitations imposed by the federal constitution." True, the
"full faith and credit" section "does not require enforcement of every right
which has ripened into a judgment of another state or has been conferred
by its statutes. But the room left for the play of conflicting policies is a
narrow one. One state need not enforce the penal laws of another. A state

may adopt such system of courts and form(s) of remedies as it sees fit.
It may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine forum non conveniens. But
it may not, under guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny enforcement of

claims otherwise within [the full faith and credit obligationi when its

courts have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. For
the states of the Union, the constitutional limitations imposed by [ithe 'full
faith and credit' section] abolished in large measure the general principle of
international law by which local policy is permitted to dominate rules of
comity. Here . . . the liability is contractual....
Obviously, recognition
could not be accorded to a local policy of New Jersey, if there really were
one, of enabling all residents of the State to escape performance of a oluntarily assumed obligation, consistent with morality, to contribute to the
payment of the depositors of a bank of another state of which they were
stockholders." (The italics are mine.)
Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented. Cf. the orotund hnt hopelessly vague divagations of Chief Justice White in Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 21-2,,.
37 Sup. Ct. 366, 61 L. Ed 565:
"The right to enforce a foreign contract in another foreign country
could alone rest upon . . . comity. . . . An independent state . . . will not . . .
enforce a contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would . .
violate the public policy of the state where the enforcement . . . is sought
• . . These principles apply with greater force to the relation of the several
states to each other, since the obligations of the constitution . . . imnpose . . .
restrictions which otherwise would not obtain and exact a greater degree
of respect for each other than otherwise by . . . comity would be expected.
... Was there any local public policy in . . . Te.ras which, consistently with
the duty of . . . that state under the constitution to give effect to a contract
validly made in another state, was sufficient to warrant a refusal by . . .
that state to discharge such duty? . . . We must not be understood as expressing any opinion . . . whether, consistently with . . . constitutional obligations . . . Texas, under guise of . . . public policy . . . could rightly refuse
to enforce a contract validly made in another state; or at all events. whethe,.
. . . such a contract would not in the nature of things be enforceable in the
appropriate courts of the United States:" (The italics are mine.)

But cf. Brandeis, J. (pro. Cur.) in Bradford Elect. Co. v. Clapper, (1932)
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tinction to be maintained, between the several United States? Sup286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026, that the constitutional
obligation:
"does not require enforcement of every right conferred by a statute of
another state. There is room for some play of conflicting policies. Thus, a
plaintiff suing in New Hampshire on a statutory cause of action arising in

Vermwnt might be denied relief because the forum fails to provide a court
with jurisdiction of the controversy; or . . . fails to provide procedure appropriate to its determination; or . . . because .

.

. enforcement . . . would

be obnoxious to the public policy of the fortom; or . .. because the liability
imposed is deemed . . . penal. . . . A state may on occasion declhe to enforce a foreign cause of action. In so doing it izerely denies a remnedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it
elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive defence under the
applicable law of another state subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not be done." (The italics are mine.)
Cf. ante, notes 114, 115, and text thereto. Cf. Brandeis, J. (pro Cur.) in
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926.
That an attempt by Texas
"to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize
property in payment . . . violates the guarantee" [of due process].

True,

a state "is not bound to provide remedies and procedure to suit ... individual
litigants. . . . But the Texas statute purports to create rights and obligations. .

.

. Doubtless a state may prohibit the enjoyment . . . within its

borders of rights acquired elsewhere which violate its laws or public policy.
and under such circumstances it may refuse to aid in the enforcement of
such rights.... We need not consider how far a state may go .. . in refus-

ing.., enforcement of rights acquired beyond its borders." (The italics are
mine.)
Cf. Oceanic Co. v. Mellor, (1914) 233 U. S. 718, 732-34, 34 Sup. Ct. 754,
58 L. Ed. 1171; Cuba Ry. v. Crosby, (1912), 222 U. S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. 132,
56 L. Ed. 274. West. Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, (1914), 234 U. S. 542, 34
Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457. (per Holmes, J.) Cf. the present writer's Has
the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law, (1931) 15
MINNESOrA LAW REviEw 161, 162, 163, 175, and note 67. The decision in
Broderick v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, flows directly
from such cases as Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, (1900) 176 U. S. 640,
20 Sup. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619; Converse v. Hamilton, (1911) 224 U. S.
243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749; Marin v. Augedahl, (1917) 247 U. S.
142, 38 Sup. Ct. 452, 62 L. Ed. 1038. All these cases in some sense involved
foreign judicial proceedings as well as foreign law; cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269 (cf. ante, note
118) ; Royal Arcanum v. Green, (1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59
L. Ed. 1089; (1931) 15 M61INNESOTA LAW REviEw 161, 176, 177. Professor
Nutting's difficulties in defining Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine.
(1935) 19 MInNESOTA LAW REvmw 196 seem due in part to his neglect of
this distinction. It seems that if a citizen of State Y in State X makes a
contract with a citizen of State X, there lawful, and to be wholly or "substantially" performed there, State Y must enforce the contract in its courts
even though it forbade its citizen to make it and though his contract in
the same terms made within State Y would have been illegal. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832; Hartford
Acc. Co. v. Delta Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed.
1178; Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co., (1927) 275 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 124,
72 L. Ed. 277.
"As Texas has statutes which give an action for wrongfully causing
death, of course there is no general objection of policy to enforcing such a
liability there, although it arose in another jurisdiction." Holmes, J. (pro
Cur.), in Slater v. Mex. Nat'l Ry., (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581,
48 L. Ed. 900. (The italics are mine.) Cf. ante, note 91.
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pose State X to have legalized gamb!ing, outlaw in State Y. If
action is brought initially in State Y to recover losses incurred at
play in State X, State Y apparently may refuse recovery as contra
bonos mores; but if action were brought first in State X and judgment there given for the plaintiff (as it would be), he then has a
constitutional right to demand State Y's enforcement of that judgment. Has such a distinction between the constitutional obligation
of a judgment and of the primary cause of action underlying it
any sound basis ? ' The rue as to judgments will no doubt be
maintained, it represents the first and plainest intent of the constitutional provision. That being true, might not State Y properly
be required also to enforce the primary cause of action? But as
between the United States or any of them and foreign countries,
according to Hilton v. Gltyot' 2 American courts need not honor
a foreign judgment; wherefore they need not be required to enforce the foreign primary cause of action.' 24
The "full faith and credit" section apparently goes no further
than to require state Y in a proper case to give effect to the statute
law of state X, as distinguished from its "common" law; but it
has been discovered that the "dtue process" clause inhibits state Y
from giving judgment for the plaintiff on facts that ought to be
controlled by some foreign law unless the proper foreign law would
justify recovery,--and this is regardless of whether such "l)roper"
foreign law be that of a foreign country or of another one of the
United States, and apparently irrespective of whether the particular
rule came to be the law of the foreign land by definite legislative
enactment or by judicial development.'- It is believed any dis'2-Cf. ante, note 92.

123(1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95. Cf. Traders
Tr. Co. v. Davidson, (1920) 146 Minn. 224, 178 N. W. 735. Cf. ante,
note 93.
1z4Even internationally, where the facts all have relation only to the
one foreign country, X, need State Y feel morally outraged at being asked
to enforce the claim, even though it would hold the same facts occurring
at home illegal or immoral? Cf. Veytia v. Alvarez, (1926) 30 Ariz. 316, 247
Pac. 117. In such cases the argument that one of the United States ought
not to refuse enforcement to any cause of action arising in another one of
them as intolerably immoral has especial cogency (cf. ante, note 94). Yet
where a citizen of the forum is affected or the facts have any other distinct
relevance to it, the urge is strong to deny recovery by applying tile forum's
own standards of policy-or morals. Shannon v. Georgia Ass'n, (1901) 78
Miss. 955, 30 So. 51; Ertel Bieber Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A. C. 260,
87 L. J. K. B. 531, 8 Br. Rul. Cas. 734.
l25For the "due process" clause has international as well as inter-state
application; and it draws no distinction between foreign laws according to
their genesis. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct.
338, 74 L. Ed. 926, (ante, note 118). The Australian constitution contains

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

tinction, based on the "full faith and credit" provision, between
foreign statute law and judge-made law has in view of the fourteenth amendment no longer any substantive importance; and,
niceties of verbal constitutional exegesis aside, no good reason appears why the constitutional standing of a rule of law of State (or
country) X before the courts of State Y should depend on how it
came to be the law of X. If it is now the law of X, it would seem
it ought to be equally obligatory (or non-obligatory) upon State
y.126

It will bear repeating that in all this the Supreme Court is
legislating-developinga field of law that the constitution intended
Congress to occupy, and that is inherently and entirely political.
The comihon law distinguishes broadly between rights in rem and
in personam, and it is currently held that if A, of State (or country) Y, owns real or personal property situated in State (or country) X, and according to the law of X his title becomes divested,
the change of ownership should be given effect everywhere, including Y, although no judicial proceeding in State X has authenticated the transfer. The Supreme Court appears disposed to enforce this rule as a constitutional obligation (and regardless of
whether the old or the new owner happens to be plaintiff in the
litigation that ensues in Y or elsewhere),1" at least if the property
was in X with A's consent and was at rest there and not simply in
transit through X at the time it is alleged X's law operated to
divest A's title. "' These limitations show that the doctrine itself
no "due process" clause; but its "full faith and credit" section is broader

than ours. See ante, note 35. Cf. ante, Notes 107, 108, and the text to
Notes 109, 110; and cf. Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of
Constitutional Law, (1931) 15 IMfINNFSOTA LAw REVIEW 161, 169-172, 176178.
126But the genesis of the foreign rule may still have "procedural"
importance Before the courts of State Y the question: What is the common law of State X? presents a different and often a considerably more
difficult problem than the question: What is its statutory law? See (1931)
15 MIqNEsoTA LAw Rxvmw 161, notes 43, 48, 55, 56, and pp. 176 (and
note 71), 179-180. Cf. post, notes 145, 149, 150, and text thereto.
27Cf. ante, notes 111-121, and text thereto.
1"-CammeU v. Sewell, (1858) 3 H. & N. 617, 27 L J. Ex. 447, (1860) 5
H. & N. 728; Edgerly v. Bush, (1880) 81 N. Y. 199; Schmidt v. Perkins.
(1907) 74 N. J. L. 785, 67 AtI. 77; Goetschius v. Brightman, (1927) 245
N. Y. 186, 156 N. E. 660; Direction, etc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., (1925) 267
U. S.22, 45 Sup. Ct. 207, 69 L. Ed. 495; Green v. Van Buskirk, (1868) 7
Wall. (U.S.) 139, 19 L. Ed. 109; Hervey v. Rhode Island Loc. Works,
(1876) 93 U. S.664, 23 L. Ed. 1003. Cf. Folliott v. Ogden, (1789) 1 H. BI.
123; Wright v. Nutt, (1788) Dick. 691, 1 H. BI. 136; Sill v. Worsick,
(1791) 1 H. B1. 665; The Helena, (1801) 4 Ch. Rob. 3; The Segredo,
(1853) 1 Ecc. & Ad. 36,22 L. T. 0. S.36; Simpson v. Fogo, (1862) 1 Hem.
& M. 195; Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank, (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917;
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is no logical corollary of "sovereignty" based on "power," but is a
21
rule of ethics and policy,-i.e., a matter of political adjustment.-'
On the basis of sheer "physical power," the property now being in
State Y, that state is perfectly able to control the title as it chooses,
by applying any sort of domestic or foreign law it may please.5 0
Any constitutional restraint is purely political, and was so envisaged by the draftsmen of the constitution.
In private law generally a good deal can be said for the proposition that it is well to develop a subject first judicially. Actual litigation presents situations and exposes difficulties that legislators
framing statutes in advance would not think of nor adequately
Clark v. Willard, (1935) 292 U. S. 112, 54 Sup. Ct. 615, 78 L. Ed. 1160;
Crapo v. Kelly, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed. 430; (1931) 15
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 161, 172-175.
129So, Alaska Pckrs. Ass'n v. Ind. Com. (per Stone, J.) (U.S. 1935)
55 Sup. Ct. 578:
"The California statute does not purport to have any extraterritorial
effect in the sense that it undertakes to impose a rule for foreign tribunals.
...We assume that in Alaska the employe, had he chosen to do so, could
have claimed the benefits of the Alaska statute, and that if any effect were
there given to the California statute it would be only by comity or by virtue
of [the full faith and credit section]

....

Objections . . . founded upon the

fourteenth amendment therefore must be directed, not to the existence of
the power to impose liability . . . but to the manner of its exercise as being
so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a denial of due process ...
[California] had a legitimate public interest in controlling and regulating
this . . . relation. .

.

. It is unnecessary to consider what effect should be

given to the California statute if the parties were domiciled in Alaska.
or were their relation to California such as to give it a lesser interest in protecting the employe. . . . In the case of statutes, the e.rtra-territorial effect

of which Congress has not prescribed, where the policy of one state comes
into conflict with that of another, the necessity of some accommodation of
the conflicting interests of the two states is . . . apparent. . . . The conflict
is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit
clause, . . . but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction."

(The italics are mine.)
13OSubject of course to the condition that its disposition might be practically effective only so long as the property remains within its physical
control. During the World War, but before the United States entered it,
the United States Supreme Court awarded the SS. Appam to her British
owners in the teeth of an earlier German judgment condemning her as prize
(1917) 243 U. S.124, 37 Sup. Ct. 337, 61 L. Ed. 633; see Garner, Prize Law
during the World War, sees. 68, 69, 173. Suppose the United States had
not entered the war and the ship later had conic into, e.g., a Swedish port
and there the owners under the German prize sale had sued to recover her
from the British owners to whom the United States Supreme Court had
awarded her. Sweden then could manifestly award her to either claimant,
or could confiscate her to the Swedish Government. Cf. Hughes v. Cornelius,
(1682) 2 Show. 232, T. Raym. 473, 2 Smith, Leading Cases, Ist ed. 434; The
Flad Oyen, (1799) 1 Ch. Rob. 135; The Helena, (1801) 4 Ch. Rob. 3:
Simpson v. Fogo, (1862) 1 Hem. & M. 195; Castrique v. Imrie, (1860) 8
C. B. N. S.405, (in the House of Lords) (1870) 4 H. L. 414, 39 L. J. C. P.
350; Direction v. U. S. Steel Corp., (1925) 267 U. S.22, 45 Sup. Ct. 207,
69 L. Ed. 495; Edgerly v. Bush, (1880) 81 N. Y. 199. See (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 161, 174.
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provide for. After the courts have lhammered a body of doctrine
and distinctions out of a sufficient amount of case material, only
then can the legislature profitably codify-and incidentally harmonize and clarify-the results. If the courts have taken an unfortunate position, subsequent legislation can overrule the cases.
But here the Supreme Court is treating as self-executing a constitutional provision which its framers did not intend should be selfexecuting. If the rules the Court is working out are to be taken
as implicit directly in the constitution itself-and otherwise, by
what right does the Court enounce them at all ?-then, as suggested
in the preceding article, how much play can it be thought will be
left for (possibly badly needed) legislative revision thereof?'"'
The fact that both the "full faith and credit" section and the fourteenth amendment expressly authorize Congress to legislate for
their implementing and completion will perhal)s save the judicially
developed rules from being deemed entirely sacrosanct; yet it is
standards of "reasonableness" that the Court is endeavoring to
erect,-than which there is no other word so a!l-controlling and
overpowering (nor more undefinable and "political") in all our
constitutional law. 32
Assuming the authority of Congress, it may be suggested that
it would better legislate only piece-meal for a time (as the Supreme
Court has been doing) instead of attempting to formulate any code
or comprehensive statement of the extra-territorial effect of state
law. The general problem is perhaps the u!timate one-as it seems
the most baffling-in the whole realm of "private international
law." Some points seem ready for settlement, on which the Stpreme Court as yet has not clearly spoken ex cathedra. The case of
Haddock v. Haddock cries aloud for some uniform legislative determination of the inter-state effect of American divorces"'3 . Again,
131Cf, ante, notes 32, 66, 106-109, and text thereto. Cf. Stone, J., in
Alaska Pckrs. Ass'n v. Ind. Com., (U.S. 1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 518 that:
"In the case of statutes, the e.rtra-territorialeffect of -which Congress
has not prescribed, the necessity of some accommodation ... is ...apparent.
...Conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith
and credit clause . . .but by appraising the governmental intterests of each
jurisdiction :" (The italics are mine.)
Yet, legislation absente, what effect can the Supreme Court give to the
constitutional provision except an assumed "automatic" effect,-i.e., an effect
deemed to flow necessarily from the bare statement in the constitution, and
thereby2 inevitably paramount to any act of Congress?
23 See Corwin, (1934)
The Twilight of the Supreme Court; Plessy v
Ferguson, (1896) 163 U. S.537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256.
133(1906) 201 U. S.562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L Ed. 867.
Probably a
better solution of this particular point would be by direct constitutional
amendment to federalize the whole regulation of marriage and divorce; cf.
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it is never all the relevant law of State X that is held applicable to
litigation in State Y, but only its "substantive" law; the "procedural" law of State Y is always to control the course of litigation
in its courts. But the line of discrimination runs in great confusion.
The English courts have held that the whole question of what
relief a plaintiff is entitled to is for the "law of the forum." The
law of the foreign land where the facts occurred should determine
whether plaintiff has any case at all; if it says he has, then the
forum by its own law should decide what relief he should obtain.', "
American courts on the whole have controlled the measure of recovery by the foreign law when that law was statutory (e.g., a Lord
Campbell's act) ; but it has been held that the "common law"
measure of damages for acts wrongful at comon law is matter
of "procedure." The general statutes of limitation are often held
"procedural ;" but special limitations specially annexed to statutory
causes of action, and a title to property vested by adverse possession under statute of limitations, have been held "substantive." ' 5
What sound basis of ethics or policy have such distinctions?
In this connection it is interesting to note that no British
legislation has been found that formulates any standards for the
application of foreign law by the courts of England, or requires
the English courts ever to apply foreign law at all. In practice the
English courts of course have applied foreign law to foreign facts,
and their criteria seem as confused and obscure as ours.'"0 The
the constitution of Canada (British North America Act 1867-30 & 31 Vict.,
ch. 3) : VI. 91 (26), 92 (12). The constitution of Australia (63 Vict., ch.
12, sec. 51) empowers the commonwealth (national) parliament to "makc
laws . . . with respect to:

"(xxi.) Marriage:
"(xxii.) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto.
rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants."
parental
' 34The classic case is Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, 66 L. J.
Q. B. 542. The statement is to be understood in connection with the rule
of The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 37 L. J. Adm. 33, by which no
relief will be awarded in England on foreign facts unless it is awardable by
application of the domestic rules of English law.
13
5See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, ch. 5; especially secs. 81, 85-87, 91.
Cf. Atwood v. Walker, (1901) 179 Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 58; Dorr Cattle
Co. v. Des Moines, (1904) 127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918, (on re-hearing)
102 N. W. 836.
"We may lay on one side as quite inadmissible the notion that the law
of the place of the act may be resorted to so far as to show that the act
was a tort, and then may be abandoned, leaving the consequences to be determined according to the accident of the place where the defendant may
happen to be caught." Holmes, J. (pro Cur.) in Slater v. Mex. Nat'l Ry.,
(1904) 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900.
13 GLiverpool & G. W. S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., (1889) 129 U. S. 397,
9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788; In re. Missouri SS. Co., (1889) 42 Ch. D.
321, 58 L. J.Ch. 721. In those cases the United States Supreme Court and
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British statutes, however, taken in connection with the rule of The
Halley, 37 do recognize a certain distinction between "primary"
foreign facts, and foreign judgments. According to The Halley,
foreign facts not embodied in a judgment are not actionable unless
they are actionable under the domestic rules of English law; but
it seems a foreign judgment may be enforced in England though
based on foreign facts that would not have constituted an English
cause of action,--although even a foreign judgment is not registrable in England if founded on a cause of action deemed distinctly
13 8
immoral or counter to English "public policy."
For the enforcement of foreign judgments these statutes thus
lay down virtually the rule the several United States have habitually applied to "primary" foreign causes of action. 3 '
Confronted with foreign judgments arrived at by refusing to
the English court of appeal both professed to adopt the rule that a contract
should be governed by-the law which the parties intended should control it.
But to the American court it seemed clear that the parties intended American
law to govern their relations; while the English court on substantially parallel
facts felt as sure the parties had English.law in view. The joke is that the
English court delayed its decision to await the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, and then congratulated itself on finding itself "in entire accordance with the law laid down in the American courts I"
"It is obvious in adopting the principles which I have stated we are
proceeding not only according to the English law, but also according to the
law of America. It is very desirable ... that the law relating to the interchange of comity between nations should be the same." Per Fry, L. J.
Cf. The Kensington, (1902) 183 U. S. 263, 22 Sup. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed.
190, where the United States Supreme Court not only declared the parties
intended their contract to be controlled by the law of New York although
the contract stated the contrary, but also (impliedly), that they intended
it to be governed by the law of New York as expounded in the federal
courts, contrary to the rule applied by the courts of the state of New York!
The same remarkable proposition is implicit in Liverpool v. Phenix Ins. Co..
(1889) 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct.469, 32 L Ed. 988. In Hannay v. Guaranty
Trust Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1911) 187 Fed. 686 the circuit court of appeals held
that the rights of the parties should be controlled by English law, reversing
the United States district court. Later the English court of appeal held the
legal results of the same facts (not parallel facts, but the same facts, between the same parties) depended on American law; but the United States
district court had decided on a misapprehension of what the rule of American
law really was-the noble Lords knew it better. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Hannay, (1918) L. J. 87 K. B. 1223, 9 Br. Rul. Cas. 260. Cf. Thompson
Co. v.3 7Palmer, (1893) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. 1137 (per Mitchell, J.).
1 See ante, note 111.
138 See ante, notes 87-89. In MacFarlane v. Macartney, [1921] 1 Ch.
522, 90 L. J. Ch. 314, it was doubted whether a foreign judgment was enforceable in England if based on facts not a cause of action according to
English law (The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 37 L. J. Adm. 33, 18
L. T. 379.) Ought a state (or country) to enforce a foreign judgment based
on a cause of action that it would not enforce immediately? But ought it
to refuse to enforce a purely foreign cause of action on grounds of its own
local policy or moral standards? See ante, notes 92, 124, and text thereto,
and post, note 143.
139See ante, note 112, and text thereto.
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al)ply-or by misapplying-the law of England to states of fact that
the English judges have thought that law ought to control, the
English courts have vacillated. In Simpson z. Fogo the English
court of chancery refused to give effect to a Louisiana judgment
which the chancellor deemed "perverse" and "in wil ful disregard"
of the law of England and of the comity of nations.' "I Soon a fterwards the House of Lords held, that "without expressing any
opinion . . .as to what might be done in the case of a court wilfully determining that it will not, according to the usual comity,
recognize the law of other nations when clearly and plainly put
before it, [yet when] the whole of the facts appear to have been
inquired into by [the foreign court] judicially, honestly, and with
the intention to arrive at the right conclusion," the foreign judgment must be held conclusive in England, though it had misal)l)rehended the pertinent English law. 4 ' As between independent
countries it is submitted neither type of foreign judgment ought to
have conclusive effect, except, perhaps, judgments in rein, or, as
against the party who was plaintiff in the foreign action. 1ie
"chose his own forum," and it may be urged he should abide the
result.' 2 The recent English statutes would seem to prevent enforcement of such foreign judgments in England, whether tile
foreign court "wilfully disregarded" or merely "misapprehended"
the applicable English law.1'' 3 Under the Statute of Westminster
1931 the self-governing British Dominions have "full power to
4
but that is all.
make laws having extra-territorial operation ;"'1
What that "extra-territorial operation" shall be-what effect any
legislation by the United Kingdom or a Dominion shall have before the courts of any other member of the "British Commonwealth
of Nations"-is not stated.
140(1862) 1 Hem. & M. 195. The Louisiana judgment had not been
taken on default; see ante, note 93.
14'Castrique v. Imrie, (1861) 8 C. B. N. S. 405; (1870) L. R. 4 11. I,
414, 39 L. J. C. P. 350. The quotation in the text is from the opinion of
Lord Chancellor Hatherly, who had decided Simpson v. Fogo, (1863) 1 Hem.
& M. 195, 32 L. J. Ch. 249. In Lloyd v. Matthews, (1894) 155 U. S. 222,
15 Sup. Ct. 70, 39 L. Ed. 128, the United States Supreme Court held that
a state court's misconstruction of the pertinent law of another state presented
no federal question; but the present authority of that case is believed questionable. See (1931) 15 MIN,'NEsOTA LAW REviEw 161, 168, 169, 179-80.
Cf. Godard v. Gray, (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, 40 L. J. Q. B. 62.
142Barber v. Lamb, (1860) 8 C. B. N, S. 95, 29 L. J. C. P. 234. Cf.
ante, note 12. Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lune, (ante, note 91), and notes 92-94, and
the text
43 thereto.
1

See ante, notes 77, 78, 79, 87, 88.

But between states of the same

federal country it is submitted the Australian system is better. See ante,
pp. 157, 158, 165, and notes 35, 37, 39, 73, 125, 138.
11422 & 23 Geo. V., ch. 4, sec. 3.
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A final question remains: Granting State Y's duty (in a
"proper" case) to apply the law of state or country X-how shall
the State Y court ascertain what the relevant rule of X's law is?
Foreign law is treated as part of the "facts" of the instant case,
and traditionally all the "facts" must be duly pleaded, and then
proved by viva voce testimony of witnesses in open court. That
means that the Minnesota court could learn what the law of-e.g.,
Wisconsin-is only from the testimony of some Wisconsin lawyer
qualified as an "expert." But the pleadings and any dearth of
testimony may be pieced out by "presumptions ;"'5 under the Act
of Congress the statutes and other records of other states may be
presented directly to the court of the forum by authenticated
copies ;146 and state statutes often permit the published reports as
well as statute books of other states to be put in evidence.14 7 The
Minnesota case of Chubbuck v. Holloway is a delicious example
of the results achievable under this system. A Wisconsin statute
duly pleaded to the Minnesota court seemed to mean that the right
of action survived the death of the tort-feasor; and so held acS4sGoodrich, Conflict of Laws, sec. 83. The first presumption was that
the foreign rule is the same as the domestic one. But where the rule of the
forum is statutory, its court cannot "presume" that the foreign jurisdiction
has the same statute; hence the presumption becomes-more precariouslythat the actual foreign rule is the same as the forum's common law rule.
what the forum's rule would be but for the statute. Any such presumption
of similarity can fairly be entertained only between common law jurisdictions. Cuba Ry. v. Crosby, (1912) 222 U. S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed.
274; Male v. Roberts, (1790) 3 Esp. 163. Courts have held that "tle common law" is the same everywhere and the judges now here presiding know
what it is; if the courts of a foreign state have held differently, they are
just mistaken. St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat'l Bank, (1891) 128 N. Y. 26
27 N. E. 849; Dorr v. Des Moines, (1905) 127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918, 102
N. W. 836. Sed cf. Forepaugh v. Delaware Co., (1889) 128 Pa. St. 217, 18
Atl. 503. In truth (statutes aside), if the rule has not been formulated in
the foreign jurisdiction, the forum can only "presume" that if enounced it
would be the same as the rule the forum's courts would lay down on parallel
domestic facts. But "the common law" is "not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky ;" "the law" is simply "a statement of the circumstances under which
the public force will be brought to bear upon men through tile courts."
Holmes, J. (pro Cur.) in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909)
213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826. Cf. ante, note 126 and post.
note 150.
146
1.e., certified and declared authentic under official seal. 28 U. S. C. A
sec. 687, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 687. The statute contemplates
formal offer of such copies in proof, by the parties. Church v. Hubbart,
(1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 187, 2 L. Ed. 249; United States v. Johns, (1806)
4 Dall. (U.S.) 412, 1 L. Ed. 888; Ferguson v. Howard, (1813) 7 Cranch
(U.S.) 408, 3 L. Ed. 386. Cf. Appleton v. Lord Braybrook, (1817) 6 M.
& S. 34, 2 Stark 6; Abbott v. Abbott & Godoy, (1860) 4 Sw. & Jr. 254, 29
L. 3. P. M. & A. 57; Finlay v. Finlay, (1862) 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 149:
Concha
v. Murieta, (1889) 40 Ch. D. 543, 60 L. T. 798.
' 47Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 9855-56; and cf. secs. 9851-52.
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cordingly, by the Minnesota supreme court. But on re-hearing it
appeared that in a certain case the Wisconsin supreme court had
held that the pleaded statute did not have that effect, though it
also appeared that by another Wisconsin statute-which the plaintiff, however, had neglected formally to plead-the right of action
really did survive. Whereupon the Minnesota supreme court reversed its former disposition of the case and held that since the
action did not survive by virtue of the only Wisconsin statute of
whose existence it could be officially aware, therefore the plaintiff
had failed to present a case.14s
The federal courts "take judicial notice" of the law of all the
states; and some states have authorized or required their courts to
do the same. 14 9 It is suggested that any such practice had better
be optional rather than mandatory; certainly, if it be extended to
the law of foreign countries. With law school training and practical experience in one's own system of law, it is no easy matter
to delve hurriedly into a foreign system and be at all sure of one's
ground; but it would seem an American judge might well enough
determine the law of any of the United States in the same way that
he determines the law of his own state-which is "judicial notice."
The bottom difficulty is that his determination of the law of his
own state is a very different thing from his conclusion as to the
foreign law. The rule he enounces is the law of his own state (for
that case at least) by his very utterance of it as such ; but his statement of any foreign law is after all only his opinion.'" It seems
likely that Congress could authorize our state courts to take
judicial notice of the laws of other states. Under the "full faith
148(1931) 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, 868.
149See Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts, (1928) 12
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On appeal from a state supreme court the United States Supreme Court
"judicially knows" only the law so known to the particular state court.
Hanley v. Donoghue, (1885) 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29 L. Ed. 535.
15°Cf. ante, notes 126, 145. Cf. Bremer v. Freeman & Bremer, (1857) 10
Moo. P. C. C. 306, 29 L. T. 0. S. 251; Castrique v. Imrie, (1861) 8 C. B.
N. S. 405, (1807) L. R. 4 H. of L. 414, 39 L. J. P. C. 350; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Hannay, (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. 1223, 9 Br. Rul. Cas. 260. Explored
from the outside, the law even of an adjacent American state may prove
tricky, as the case of Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225, 234
N. W. 314 shows. For opposed fundamental points of view, cf. Carter,
The Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, and Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law. There seems sonic doubt whether 'judicial notice"
does not exclude proof as well as dispense with its nccessity,-whethcr
the court will hear evidence to contradict what it "judicially knows."
Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 2567, 2569-70. For the purpose in question it
is submitted evidence ought not to be excluded; not even the "expert" evidence of foreign lawyers.

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

and credit" section Congress may "prescribe the effect" which "the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings" of one state shall
have in another; and the word "records" might be held to include
the published reports.' 5' Undoubtedly in every case the question of
the purport of the foreign law should be for the judge alone and
not a jury question.15 2
A glance back at the original act of Connecticut Colony shows
that it contemp!ated that the courts of Conneticut might properly
"aduise with" the court of the "neighboring Colonye" where the
earlier judgment had been rendered."' 5 Chancery at discretion will
submit all or some selected issues of a pending case for trial before
a jury. Extending this practice modern British legislation provides
that when in any case it becomes needful to know foreign law the
English court may "direct a case to be prepared, setting forth the
facts," and may "remit the same to any superior court in"the
foreign jurisdiction "for opinion on such law." Such foreign court
may consider the postulated facts "either with or without hearing
the parties ;" and on receiving the foreign court's conclusions the
English court may either "take the opinion as law of the case" or
may submit it to the (English) jury "as evidence, or as conclusive
evidence, as the court may think fit," of the foreign law therein
stated. 5 4 The original Act of Parliament applied only where the
"foreign" jurisdiction was within the British Empire; but the next
session of Parliament authorized extension of the procedure to
foreign countries by treaty and required the courts of England to
give reciprocal opinions on reference from the courts of such
foreign countries; also, that if the English court is not satisfied
that the opinion it has obtained correctly represents the applicable
foreign law it may resubmit the facts, with or without amendment, to another court in the foreign land, "and so from time to
15 5
The court apparently
time as may be necessary or expedient."
15See (1931) 15
55.
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See Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts, (1928) 12 MINNESoTA LAw
439. The Administration of Justice Act, (1920) provides that any
question of foreign law arising in English litigation "shall, instead of being
submitted to the jury, be decided by the judge alone." 10 & 11 Geo. V., ch.
81, pt. III., sec. 15.
153See ante, note 10.
154(1860) 22 & 23 Vict., ch. 63. But cf. Administration of Justice Act
1920 ante, note 152.
15524 & 25 Vict., ch. 11. These statutes are optional; the traditional
methods of proving foreign law seem still available in England. 14 & 15
Vict., ch. 99, sec. 7, provides for proof by authenticated copies of all "proclamations, treaties and other acts of state of any foreign state or any British
'
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may act sua sponte; any responsibility for pleading the foreign law
or making proof of it seems lifted from the shoulders of counsel.
This device has at least one important advantage over "taking
judicial notice" of foreign law. As already noted, any statement
of the law of State X by the court of State Y can be only the
opinion of the State Y judges; but a response given by the Court
of State X itself on such reference from State Y could well be
deemed a precedent in State X within the principle stare decisis."'
With this procedure available, or by taking judicial notice of
foreign law, a court could avoid such a judicial contretemps as
Chubbuck v. Holloway.1 5 7 Highly desirable as this method of
reference is, it seems doubtful whether Congress could authorize
our state courts to use it. The "full faith and credit" clause does
not purport to enable Congress to regulate the proof of "the law"
of State X for the courts of State Y; apparently it contemplates

authenticating only definite legislative, administrative or judicial
acts of State X, already performed-although Congress is empowered to "prescribe the effect" which the law (statutory or
judicially developed) of State X shall have in litigation in State
But each and any one of the United States could-and it is
Y. 1
submitted should--adopt this English procedure for itself.
colony, and all judgments, decrees, orders and other judicial proceedings of
any court of justice in any foreign state or . . . British colony, and all

affidavits, pleadings and other legal documents;" and 7 Edw. VII., ch. 16,
provides that copies of colonial and dominion statutes which purport to be
officially printed may be received in evidence in Great Britain "without any
proof being given that the copies were so printed." And viva voce testimony
of foreign lawyers seems still to be received in the English courts. Concha
v. Murieta, (1889) 40 Ch. D. 543, 60 L. T. 798; Kaufman v. Gerson, 119041
1 K. B. 591, 73 L. J. K. B. 320, 4 Br. Rul. Cas. 414; Guaranty Tr. Co. v.
Hannay, [1918] 2 K. B. 623, 87 L. J. K. B. 1223, 9 Br. Rul. Cas. 260; MacFarlane v. Macartney, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, 90 L. J. Ch. 314. This is as it
should be. See ante, note 150.
25sInvolving actual litigation, it would not be subject to the reproach
of being a merely "advisory" opinion on a "moot" case. It could not even
be deprecated as only "declaratory," unless the State Y litigation for which

it was given were an action to obtain only a declaratory judgment.
ante, note 150, and text thereto.
15See ante, note 148.
15bIe., in connection with the fourteenth amendment.

109, 110, 125, 126, 151, and the text thereto.

See

See ante, notes

